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HELP ME HELP YOU:  WHY CONGRESS’S 
ATTEMPT TO COVER TORTS COMMITTED 
BY INDIAN TRIBAL CONTRACTORS WITH 
THE FTCA HURTS THE GOVERNMENT AND 
THE TRIBES 
JOSEPH W. GROSS∗ 
Since the Nixon Administration, the U.S. government has attempted to 
promote tribal self-determination among Native Americans.  Under the Indian 
Self-Determination Act, the tribes can enter into agreements with the federal 
government to take over services previously provided to the tribes by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA).  By entering into these contracts, the tribes have been 
able to administer a wide variety of services, including construction and law 
enforcement, which bring income and employment to Indian country.  These 
contracts do not always run smoothly, however, and sometimes people get 
injured.  Under a series of amendments to the Indian Self-Determination Act, 
when tribal contractors commit torts, the federal government steps in and 
defends the tribal contractors under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as if 
they were employees of the government.  The government pays out any 
settlements or judgments from the Judgment Fund.  This scenario is a complete 
departure from the traditional FTCA rule whereby contractors are only treated 
as government employees in exceedingly limited circumstances. 
In hastily extending the FTCA to cover tribal contractors, Congress 
contravened FTCA jurisprudence in theory and in practice.  Congress 
                                                 
 ∗ Senior Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 62; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2013, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Political 
Science, 2008, University of Pennsylvania.  Many thanks to Professor Paul Figley for his 
guidance and mentorship in bringing this idea to fruition and to my fiancée Stacey 
for her love and patience throughout the process.  Thanks also to Gail Johnson and 
Conor Kells for encouraging me to explore this topic.  Thanks to my family for their 
constant support in all of my endeavors.  I am grateful to the editors and staff of the 
American University Law Review for their meticulous edits and thoughtful suggestions.  
Any remaining errors are mine alone. 
GROSS.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:50 PM 
384 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:383 
intended to help the tribes avoid having to buy costly insurance by directly 
assuming liability under the FTCA.  While perhaps well-intentioned, the result 
is a system of perverse incentives and a string of inconsistent decisions.  Courts 
struggle to apply the FTCA’s waiver of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity to the tribes, which remain separate sovereigns that retain some of 
their own sovereign immunity.  The arrangement also creates problems in 
determining whether tribal contractors are within the scope of their employment 
and undertaking discretionary functions.  Furthermore, the statutory scheme 
creates the potential for tribal law to govern the United States’ tort liability and 
may have inadvertently created a loophole for the intentional torts of tribal law 
enforcement officers.  The end result of this untenable situation is that savvy 
tribes recognize the unpredictability of the FTCA protection and purchase 
private insurance anyway, sometimes with federal contract support funds.  
This is the exact result Congress hoped to avoid. 
Congress should end the experiment of extending the FTCA to cover 
tribal contractors and replace it with subsidized private insurance.  This 
new arrangement would simplify the process for potential claimants and 
keep the government from having to pay the duplicative costs of insurance 
and judgments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Mildred Garcia pulled her car off the road in rural 
Arizona to take a rest when a patrol car driven by a tribal police 
officer from the Navajo Nation Department of Public Safety swerved 
off the road and slammed into her car.1  Ms. Garcia had to be 
extracted from the wreckage using the “jaws of life” and suffered 
severe trauma, including injuries to her spine.2  The tribal officer, 
clad in shorts and a t-shirt, had consumed an 18-pack of beer and a 
quart of rum prior to blacking out and crashing his cruiser into Ms. 
Garcia’s car.3  Smelling strongly of alcohol, the officer eventually 
admitted to being under the influence.4  The tort victim and her 
family brought a lawsuit, but rather than suing the officer or the 
tribe, the family sued the United States.5 
Although the United States had no involvement in the tribal 
officer’s hiring, training, or supervision, a federal district court in 
Arizona found the officer to be acting as a federal employee within 
the scope of his employment because of a series of laws governing 
tribal contracting with the United States.6  As a result, the court 
denied the United States’ motion for summary judgment in several 
key parts, and the federal government agreed to pay a hefty 
                                                 
 1. Garcia v. United States, No. 3:09-CV-08033 JWS, 2011 WL 285860, at *1 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 27, 2011). 
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. Id. at *1–2. 
 4. Id. at *2. 
 5. Id. at *4. 
 6. See id. at *5 (noting that Congress extended the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) to make the United States liable for torts committed by tribal contractors 
within the scope of their employment to limit the liability incurred by the tribes). 
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settlement.7  Potential payouts like this, encouraged through federal 
legislation defining the tribal contractor relationship, come at a time 
when lawmakers clamor to cut government spending deemed 
wasteful and excessive.8 
Since the 1970s, the United States’ policy towards the Indian tribes 
has been to encourage self-government by allowing the tribes to take 
over programs formerly administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) through the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act9 (Self-Determination Act).10  On reservations and tribal 
lands across the country, the tribes have been taking advantage of this 
policy, contracting to take over programs such as local law 
enforcement previously provided to the tribes by the government.11  
The transition to self-determination, however, has not been seamless. 
Major issues arise when tribal contractors commit torts while 
carrying out these contracts.  Instead of carrying insurance like most 
government contractors, Congress created a legal fiction whereby 
tribal contractors are deemed to be employees of the federal 
government covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act12 (FTCA), which 
provides a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.13  
That means the United States can be held liable for judgments 
against tribal contractors even though it has little-to-no involvement 
in their hiring or supervision.14  This arrangement can leave the 
                                                 
 7. See id. at *9 (granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of whether the officer was within the scope of his employment and denying the 
United States’ motion for summary judgment).  Ultimately, Plaintiff’s counsel failed 
to follow critical court filing deadlines and the case was dismissed.  Garcia v. United 
States, No. 3:09-CV-08033-JWS (D. Ariz. May 22, 2012) (order dismissing case). 
 8. See Helene Cooper, Obama Offers Plan to Cut Deficit by Over $3 Trillion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/us/politics/obama-
plan-to-cut-deficit-will-trim-spending.html (outlining President Obama’s deficit 
reduction plan).   
 9. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 450–458ddd-2 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 10. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 564–
68 (July 8, 1970) (announcing the Nixon Administration’s new policy shift towards 
tribal self-determination); Thomas W. Christie, An Introduction to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act in Indian Self-Determination Act Contracting, 71 MONT. L. REV. 115, 116 
(2010) (tracing the history of the Self-Determination Act). 
 11. See Blake R. Bertagna, Reservations About Extending Bivens to Reservations:  
Seeking Monetary Relief Against Tribal Law Enforcement Officers for Constitutional Violations, 
29 PACE L. REV. 585, 587 (2009) (suggesting that Congress specifically passed the 
Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA) to facilitate Self-Determination Act 
contracts for tribal law enforcement). 
 12. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, §§ 401–424, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47 (1946) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 13. See infra Part I.A (discussing the FTCA’s history and its relation to the concept 
of sovereign immunity). 
 14. See, e.g., Red Elk ex rel. Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104, 1108 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (finding the United States liable when a poorly trained tribal police officer 
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United States financially responsible even when tribal contractors, 
like the officer who hit Ms. Garcia, commit blatant abuses.15 
Some courts have recognized the problem of holding the United 
States responsible for tribal contractors over whom it has little control 
and have drawn fine lines to protect the United States from liability 
in certain situations involving law enforcement.16  Although these 
decisions are friendlier to the public fisc,17 the tort victims lose the 
recourse they would have had if the tortfeasor worked for the U.S. 
government directly instead of pursuant to a tribal contract.18  The 
resulting uncertainty from these decisions undercuts Congress’s 
decision to extend FTCA protection to the tribes. 
This Comment examines the purposes and history of the FTCA as 
well as the laws, like the Self-Determination Act, that govern tribal 
contracting and proposals for reform.  This Comment then argues 
that extending the FTCA to cover torts committed by Self-
Determination Act contractors contravenes the purpose of the FTCA.  
The analysis proceeds by addressing specific provisions relating to 
sovereign immunity, scope of employment, contractors, law 
enforcement, and choice of law.  Part I describes the historic 
development of the laws governing tribal contracting and the 
extension of the FTCA to cover Indian contractors.  Part II argues 
that using the FTCA to cover Indian contractors is a poor fit and that 
the results undermine Congress’s reasons for doing so.  Part III 
                                                 
raped a minor); Garcia v. United States, No. 3:09-CV-08033-JWS, 2011 WL 285860, at 
*1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2011) (denying the United States’ motion for summary 
judgment when an officer blacked out and crashed his police car into another 
motorist); see also infra Part II.C (discussing contractor liability under the FTCA and 
the difficulties that arise in the tribal context). 
 15. See infra Part II.C (articulating contractor liability under the FTCA as applied 
to tribal contractors). 
 16. See, e.g., Henin v. Cancel, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (using 
the definition of federal law enforcement officer to effectively bar intentional tort 
claims against a tribal police officer). 
 17. In cases like Henin, where one of the FTCA’s exceptions applies, the United 
States does not waive its sovereign immunity over the claim and the court has no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.  708 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; see Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
546 U.S. 481, 484–85 (2006) (discussing the requirements that must be met for a 
federal court to have jurisdiction over an FTCA claim).  Therefore, there can be no 
recovery against the United States, which can only pay as directed by Congress.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  Because the money paid out in FTCA suits ultimately comes 
from the public fisc, government attorneys should scrupulously attempt to apply the 
FTCA’s exceptions.  Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & the Federal Tort Claims Act:  An 
Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 373–74 (2011). 
 18. See Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151 (D.N.M. 2003) 
(dismissing a suit against tribal police officers who were not federal law 
enforcement officers but noting that “[u]nder different circumstances, the acts of 
[the tribal officers] might subject the United States to liability because of their 
status as federal employees”). 
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recommends that Congress replace FTCA coverage with financial 
assistance to the tribes to obtain private insurance. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Federal Tort Claims Act 
The FTCA provides a narrow waiver of the U.S. government’s 
sovereign immunity.19  The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides 
that a sovereign state is immune to suit except for instances where the 
legislative branch takes action and consents to the suit.20  In practice, 
sovereign immunity means nobody can sue the United States, or a 
federal employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, 
unless Congress passes a statute waiving sovereign immunity.21  Before 
1946, Congress did not systematically waive sovereign immunity for 
torts, and the chief recourse for those injured by torts committed by 
federal employees was to petition Congress for a private bill 
compensating the victim for the damages sustained.22  Having the 
legislature evaluating and settling tort claims created problems from 
the beginning.23  Over time, the congressional process for addressing 
these claims evolved; but at its best, the process was still woefully 
                                                 
 19. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing the 
principle that the government’s consent to suit must be strictly construed in favor of 
the sovereign and must not be enlarged beyond what the statutory language 
requires). 
 20. PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 5 (2012); see Gregory 
C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 899 (2010) 
(observing that although the concept that the government can be excused from 
liability for some wrongs may seem troubling for many Americans, “few doctrines are 
more solidly anchored in Supreme Court precedent”). 
 21. FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 5–6 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)); 
see Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. at 33–34 (discussing the proper construction necessary 
for the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 
712, 717 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1979) (analogizing the FTCA to “a traversable bridge across 
the moat of sovereign immunity”). 
 22. FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 6 (observing that the right to pursue damages when 
the government causes injury comes from the First Amendment); see U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 23. See FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 6 & n.9 (tracing the history of the resolution of 
tort claims against the government and observing that Presidents John Quincy 
Adams and Abraham Lincoln expressed frustration with the cumbersome and 
inefficient congressional claims process); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 1–2 (1945) 
(reporting on legislation to waive sovereign immunity and its motivating factors). 
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inefficient.24  Congress debated various proposals to address the 
problem, but it was not able to pass a comprehensive bill until 1946.25 
The FTCA became law in 1946 and waived a considerable portion 
of the United States’ sovereign immunity.26  The FTCA, however, does 
not waive all of the United States’ sovereign immunity, and it still bars 
claims that do not meet the FTCA’s requirements.27  The FTCA 
requires that claims be: 
[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . . [3] for 
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death [4] caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government [5] while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, [6] under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.28 
Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, and courts must first 
determine if the United States has waived its sovereign immunity with 
a statute like the FTCA before a case can proceed to the merits.29 
The FTCA does not create a federal common law for torts and 
instead relies on the substantive state law of the place where the tort 
occurred.30  Courts have almost universally interpreted the “law of the 
place” to be state law in FTCA suits.31  For FTCA purposes, federal 
                                                 
 24. Congress created a Committee on Claims to handle tort claims against the 
government.  FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 7.  As the number of claims increased, the 
Committee’s work became very onerous because of both the volume and complexity 
of the claims.  Id. 
 25. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2245 (1942) (reporting on an early incarnation of the 
FTCA); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 1 (1940) (discussing waiving immunity with a 
liability cap at $7500); FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 7; Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift 
of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 536 (2008) 
(noting that public outcry over a 1945 incident where a military plane struck the 
Empire State Building, killing ten people whose claims were barred by sovereign 
immunity, may have hastened passage of the FTCA, but was not the impetus for it, as 
Congress had been debating similar proposals for twenty years). 
 26. FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 5–6. 
 27. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 485 (2006). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006); see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) 
(noting that a claim is only cognizable under the FTCA if it meets all six 
requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). 
 29. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that 
the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of 
consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). 
 30. See Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he FTCA’s 
basic thrust was decidedly not to create a federal common law of torts, but rather . . . 
to tie the government’s liability—albeit subject to a host of qualifications—to the 
disparate and always evolving tort law of the several states.”); infra Part II.E 
(identifying choice-of-law problems that arise in FTCA cases involving tribal 
contractors). 
 31. See LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (observing that 
under the FTCA, state substantive tort law governs even when the incident occurred 
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employees are generally defined to exclude contractors.32  The FTCA 
also contains important exceptions, including a bar on specified 
intentional torts.33  The FTCA’s primary purpose is to give a remedy 
to those who had no recourse under the previous system of absolute 
sovereign immunity, not to provide an additional recourse to those 
who already had one elsewhere.34  An important theme in FTCA cases 
is that the FTCA is only a very limited waiver of the United States’ 
sovereign immunity and that courts will strictly construe the FTCA’s 
terms in favor of the sovereign.35 
B. Snyder Act 
Congress established the BIA in 1824 to provide services to the 
tribes.36  The services the BIA provides cover a range of programs 
typically provided by state, federal, or local governments.37  The 
Snyder Act38 represents the first time Congress comprehensively 
addressed the services that the BIA provided to the tribes on Indian 
reservations.39  By the end of World War I, Congress sought to 
                                                 
on land controlled by the federal government); see also infra Part II.E (arguing that 
courts should not apply tribal law in FTCA disputes). 
 32. See Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 531–32 (1973) (noting that simply 
carrying out a function that would otherwise have been performed by a federal 
employee is insufficient to make a contractor a federal employee for purposes of the 
FTCA); see also infra Part II.C (discussing the inconsistencies between the FTCA’s 
general bar against contractor torts and Congress’s decision to extend FTCA 
coverage to tribal contractors). 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (barring claims “arising out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”); see infra II.D 
(reviewing issues that arise with torts committed by Indian law enforcement 
contractors). 
 34. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) (discussing the motivation 
behind the FTCA). 
 35. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (commenting that the waiver of 
the United States’ sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed and cannot 
be implied); see also Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984) (providing 
that a court’s goal in interpreting the FTCA is “to identify ‘those circumstances 
which are within the words and reason of the exception’—no less and no more” 
(quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953))). 
 36. Who We Are, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/ 
index.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012, 4:35 PM). 
 37. See What We Do, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhatWeDo/ 
index.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012, 4:35 PM) (mentioning education, natural 
resources management, law enforcement, social services, and economic development 
as some of the services provided). 
 38. Ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006)). 
 39. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 205–06 (1974) (noting that before the 
Snyder Act, there was no general congressional authorization for BIA activities); see 
also S. REP. NO. 67-294, at 1 (1921) (observing that there was “no basic law at the 
present time authorizing many of the items appearing in the annual Indian 
appropriation act”).  The Snyder Act authorizes the BIA to “expend such moneys as 
Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assistance of 
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consolidate the unwieldy budgetary process.40  During the nineteenth 
century, Congress had assigned jurisdiction over certain 
appropriations bills to committees other than the appropriations 
committees.41  These committees, including the Indian Affairs 
Committee, considered their own appropriations without needing 
separate authorizing legislation.42  In response, Congress passed the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 192143 to consolidate appropriations 
jurisdiction solely under the appropriations committees in the House 
and Senate.44  Under the revised appropriations system, Indian 
appropriations received greater scrutiny on the House floor, which 
resulted in many of them being struck down on points of order 
because they lacked proper legislative authorization.45  The Snyder 
Act remedied this situation by providing general authorization of 
subsequent Indian bills, including annual budget appropriations for 
the BIA.46 
The Snyder Act does not enlarge the mandate of the BIA and was 
only intended to authorize services that the BIA already provided to 
the tribes.47  Additionally, the Act does not provide a private damages 
remedy.48  The Snyder Act demonstrates Congress’s reactive approach 
to Indian law in that it belatedly provided blanket authorization to 
                                                 
the Indians throughout the United States for . . . the employment of inspectors, 
supervisors, superintendents, clerks, field matrons, farmers, physicians, Indian 
police, Indian judges, and other employees.”  25 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). 
 40. JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31572, APPROPRIATIONS 
SUBCOMMITTEE STRUCTURE:  HISTORY OF CHANGES FROM 1920–2011, at 1–2 (2011) 
(detailing the congressional concerns regarding the unwieldy nature of the 
jurisdiction and topical focus of most congressional appropriations committees). 
 41. See id. (recounting that the District of Columbia, Indian Affairs, Agriculture 
Department, Army, Navy, and Post Office committees all considered their own 
appropriations, unlike the current system where all appropriations are handled 
through a centralized appropriations committee in both the House and the Senate). 
 42. See id. at 2 (describing the piecemeal appropriations process of the early 
twentieth century). 
 43. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 703 (2006)). 
 44. TOLLESTRUP, supra note 40, at 1. 
 45. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 206 (1974) (tracing the history of the 
Snyder Act and concluding that its primary purpose was procedural). 
 46. Id.; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.01[1], at 1339 (Nell 
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 67-275, at 1 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-294, at 1 (1921); see Lincoln 
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993) (concluding that the Snyder Act creates no new 
binding obligations on the federal government). 
 48. See Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (noting that because the Snyder Act did not obligate the federal government 
to expend any funds in Indian country, failure to do so would not support a 
damages remedy). 
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programs that had been in existence for years.49  Although today the 
Snyder Act is largely a historical footnote, for almost fifty years, until 
the passage of the Self-Determination Act, it provided broad 
congressional authorization for BIA activity carried out in Indian 
country.50 
C. Indian Self-Determination Act 
After many years of providing services to the tribes, the federal 
government began implementing a policy of tribal self-determination 
in the 1970s.51  Congress initially passed the Self-Determination Act in 
1974 to promote tribal self-government.52  The Senate Committee on 
Interior Affairs noted that the passage of this bill showed how federal 
Indian policy had shifted dramatically towards the Indian tribes 
taking over the provision of services formerly administered by the BIA 
and the Indian Health Service (IHS).53  Instead of relying too heavily 
on an exceptionally broad reading of the Snyder Act, Congress 
passed the Self-Determination Act, which specifically authorized 
these new policies emphasizing tribal self-determination and 
detailing how the contracts are to be arranged.54  With the Self-
Determination Act, Congress facilitated a program wherein the 
Indian tribes can contract directly with the BIA to take over the 
provision of services in Indian country.55  As originally passed, the 
Self-Determination Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior to 
require the tribes to purchase insurance to cover any liability they 
                                                 
 49. See 61 CONG. REC. 6529 (1921) (statement of Sen. Charles Curtis) 
(commenting that the Snyder Act covers activities the BIA has been undertaking for 
thirty years). 
 50. See S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 13 (1974) (suggesting that BIA activity in Indian 
country relied on a strained reading of old statutes that were not meant to address 
the kinds of activity that the BIA was actually carrying out). 
 51. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 566 
(July 8, 1970) (“[Self-Determination], then, must be the goal of any new national 
policy toward the Indian people:  to strengthen the Indian’s sense of autonomy 
without threatening his sense of community.”). 
 52. See 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (2006) (stating that the goal of the Self-
Determination Act is to encourage “maximum Indian participation”); S. REP. NO. 93-
682, at 12–13 (1974) (tracing the history of the tribes’ relationship with the federal 
government and noting the shift from having the government directly providing 
services to the tribes to having the tribes take over these services by contract). 
 53. See S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 13 (noting that the shift in policy towards self-
determination is dramatic). 
 54. See id. (“The difficulties in straining statutory language beyond its original 
intent creates numerous administrative and management problems which [the Self-
Determination Act] is designed to correct.”); see also supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing the Snyder Act). 
 55. See S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 15 (noting that the Self-Determination Act provides 
authority for the BIA to contract with the tribes, but does not require them to do so). 
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incurred while carrying out the activities they had contracted to take 
over from the BIA.56 
The transition to self-determination, however, was not seamless.  
One problem Congress identified was that the cost of acquiring 
liability insurance was a barrier to the tribes entering into self-
determination contracts.57  Because the BIA is part of the federal 
government, the FTCA delineates liability for it and its agents in tort 
suits, and the BIA would never have needed to purchase additional 
insurance to carry out the services that the tribes were assuming.58  As 
a result, in 1988 Congress amended the Self-Determination Act, 
seeking to remove barriers to additional tribal contracting.59  The 
1988 Self-Determination Act amendments required the Secretary of 
the Interior, who oversees the BIA, to help the tribes acquire cost-
effective insurance so that more tribes could enter into Self-
Determination Act contracts.60 
Congress, however, did not wait for the Secretary of the Interior to 
promulgate regulations on private insurance for tribal contractors.  
Instead, Congress included language in the 1991 Department of the 
Interior Appropriations Bill that extended FTCA protection to tribal 
contractors working pursuant to a Self-Determination Act contract.61   
 
                                                 
 56. Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 102(c), 88 Stat. 2203, 2206 
(1975).  See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-169, FEDERAL 
TORT CLAIMS ACT:  ISSUES AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
CONTRACTS 25 fig.5 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 GAO REPORT] (depicting the early 
history of the Self-Determination Act provisions and subsequent amendments in 
graphic form). 
 57. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2186 (2012) (noting 
that the Self-Determination Act originally provided for only the direct administrative 
costs of the programs, which “failed to account for the full costs to tribes of 
providing services”); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments 
of 1987—Part II:  Hearing on S. 1703 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th 
Cong. 54 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing] (testimony of 
William Ron Allen, Chairman, Jamestown Klallam Tribe) (suggesting that insurance 
is a major indirect cost that the tribes incur when entering into a Self-Determination 
Act contract with the BIA); see also Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (Oct. 27, 1987), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 59–60 
(1987) (warning that the possibility of using the FTCA to insure tribal contractors 
violates the principle of not extending the FTCA to government contractors and 
suggesting that other contractors will seek such coverage). 
 58. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-393, at 4 (1987) (finding that because the tribes have to 
pay certain extra costs to provide the services that the government does not cover, 
some tribes feel they are being charged a penalty for the right to contract). 
 59. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat 2285 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 25 U.S.C.). 
 60. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) (2006). 
 61. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 314, 104 Stat 1915, 1959–60 (1990). 
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The bill stated: 
[Any] Indian tribe, tribal organization or Indian contractor . . . and 
its employees are deemed employees of the [U.S. government] 
while acting within the scope of their employment in carrying out 
the contract or agreement . . . .  [A]ny civil action or proceeding 
involving such claims brought hereafter against any tribe, tribal 
organization, Indian contractor or tribal employee covered by this 
provision shall be deemed to be an action against the United 
States . . . and be afforded the full protection and coverage of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.62 
Legislative history on this provision is scant, but upon signing the bill, 
President George H.W. Bush expressed “serious reservations” about 
extending the FTCA to cover tribal contractors.63  President Bush 
explained that the bill extending FTCA coverage to tribal contractors 
was “fundamentally flawed” because the United States does not 
supervise tribal contractors the way it would supervise traditional 
employees, and to do so would be counterproductive to the goal of 
Indian self-determination.64 
Congress amended the Self-Determination Act again in 1994, 
attempting to provide clarity by formally directing the Secretary of 
the Interior to promulgate regulations on how the FTCA related to 
the Self-Determination Act.65  The regulations promulgated after the 
1994 amendments give some basic guidance and specify that 
Congress extended FTCA protection to the Indian tribes contracting 
under the Self-Determination Act regardless of whether the funding 
agreement specifically mentions this coverage as a term.66  
Furthermore, the regulation notes that the FTCA is the exclusive 
remedy for tort claims resulting from Self-Determination Act 
contracts.67  Only programs previously administered by the BIA are 
                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Statement on Signing Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558 (Nov. 5, 1990). 
 64. Id. at 1559; see also infra Part II.C (arguing that classifying Indian contractors 
as federal employers contravenes FTCA jurisprudence regarding contractors). 
 65. Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 
§ 105, 108 Stat 4250, 4269 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450k (2006)); see 140 
CONG. REC. 18,389 (1994) (statement of Rep. Bill Richardson) (“The regulatory 
process has cost the tribes hundreds of thousands of dollars, and has led to great 
confusion within Indian country and among the Federal agencies.”). 
 66. 25 C.F.R. § 1000.276 (2012). 
 67. Id. § 1000.279.  But see Christie, supra note 10, at 124 (observing that at least 
one tribal court has decided that it remains responsible for certain cases).  Tribal 
members can still bring claims against tribal corporations in tribal court.  E.g., Wide 
Ruins Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. Stago, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1088–90 (D. Ariz. 2003) 
(recognizing only cognizable claims under the FTCA in federal court, but noting 
that these proceedings did not bar tribal members from bringing additional claims 
under tribal law in Navajo court). 
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eligible for Self-Determination Act contracts.68  Congress has made 
additional, minor amendments to the Self-Determination Act, but 
none have changed the application of the FTCA to tribal 
contractors.69  Despite the regulations, many questions remain 
unanswered as to the precise mechanics of applying the FTCA to 
tribal contractors, and subsequent decisions have created more 
uncertainty for the government and the tribes.70 
D. Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act 
Many Indian reservations grapple with crime rates worse than those 
in some of the country’s most violent cities.71  Violent crime rates on 
Indian reservations are more than twice the national average.72  As 
such, law enforcement is a particularly significant BIA function that 
the tribes contract for under the Self-Determination Act.73  When 
Congress began to consider challenges in tribal law enforcement, the 
BIA already employed approximately 500 law enforcement officers, 
and the tribes employed 900 more officers.74  Typical tribal police 
departments tend to be woefully understaffed, with only a few officers 
patrolling huge rural areas.75  In 1990, Congress passed the Indian 
                                                 
 68. See 25 C.F.R. § 1000.86 (noting that the BIA need not have provided that 
particular service to that particular tribe in order to enter a Self-Determination Act 
contract, as long as the BIA did provide that service to a tribe).  Regulations also 
allow for limited contracting of non-BIA programs that are designated by the 
Secretary of the Interior or have “special geographic, historical or cultural” 
significance to the tribes.  Id. §§ 1000.120–.148.  Nevertheless, some tribes still find it 
very difficult to enter into contracts with the BIA, although there are no reported 
cases where FTCA coverage was not extended to tribal contractors on the ground 
that the function they contracted for had not previously been performed by the BIA.  
See The Success and Shortfall of Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act After Twenty Years:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
110th Cong. 54 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing] 
(statement of James Steele, Jr., Tribal Council Chairman, Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes) (discussing the difficulties of contracting for non-BIA programs 
and suggesting that in the instances when the tribes are able to do so, they should get 
FTCA coverage). 
 69. See Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 
Stat. 711 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa-1 to 458aaa-18 (2006)). 
 70. See infra Part II (explaining some of the problems with applying the FTCA to 
tribal contractors). 
 71. See Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-
higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (suggesting that failure to effectively 
prosecute the crimes may be exacerbating the problem). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See S. REP. NO. 101-167, at 5 (1989) (noting the prevalence of tribal law 
enforcement being operated under Self-Determination Act contracts). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Bertagna, supra note 11, at 600–01 (contending that one to three officers 
may be in charge of policing an area roughly the size of the entire state of Delaware). 
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Law Enforcement Reform Act76 (ILERA) to “clarify and strengthen 
the authority” for law enforcement in Indian country.77  ILERA gave 
explicit statutory authority to the BIA for its law enforcement 
activities in Indian country to avoid a potentially embarrassing 
situation where a court found a BIA officer personally liable for 
carrying a firearm and making arrests without authorization.78  The 
bill also facilitated cooperation among BIA law enforcement and 
tribal law enforcement, including provision for cross-deputation 
agreements.79  Prior to the bill, Indian law enforcement rested on 
shaky statutory ground, justified only by the Snyder Act and various 
Indian liquor control laws.80  Congress passed ILERA because it 
feared judicial challenges to BIA officers and Indian contractors 
carrying out law enforcement duties in Indian country.81  In addition, 
Congress passed the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010,82 which 
further clarifies the law enforcement authority of the tribes but does 
not affect FTCA liability.83 
E. Congressional Proposals for Reform 
Using the FTCA to cover tribal contractors created a host of 
problems in theory and in practice.  Congress has tried to address 
some of these problems, but has stopped short of passing any major 
reforms.  In 1998, Senator Slade Gorton of Washington introduced 
the American Indian Equal Justice Act to address the relationship 
between sovereign immunity and the Indian tribes.84  The bill sought 
to make tribal governments liable in certain civil matters.85  Senator 
                                                 
 76. Pub. L. No. 101-379, §§ 1–11 104 Stat. 473, 473–78 (1990) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2801–2809 (2006)). 
 77. 135 CONG. REC. 10,029 (1989) (statement of Rep. George Miller). 
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 101-60, at 4–5 (1989). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See S. REP. NO. 101-167, at 5 (expressing concern that BIA officers did not 
have explicit statutory authority to exercise their law enforcement duties). 
 81. See id. (indicating that the proposed bill was intended to “avoid a successful 
judicial challenge” to BIA authority by providing “comprehensive statutory 
authority”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-60, at 4–5 (1989) (mirroring the concerns in the 
Senate committee report); see also Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1252–59 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (illustrating the complexities that arise in tribal law enforcement, even 
after ILERA, in a case involving tribal law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and 
claims under the FTCA, Bivens, and § 1983); infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the potential 
for problems that arise from the definition of Indian country and its uncertain 
boundaries in some parts of the country). 
 82. Pub. L. No. 111-211, §§ 201–266, 124 Stat 2258, 2261–2301 (codified in 
scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 83. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2812 (Supp. IV 2011) (establishing the Indian Law and 
Order Commission). 
 84. S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 85. Id. § 1(c). 
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Gorton intended his proposal to parallel the Tucker Act86 and to strip 
the tribes of sovereign immunity almost entirely.87  The Gorton bill 
gave federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions against the Indian 
tribes for injury caused by the negligence of the tribes under 
circumstances where the tribe would be liable if it were a private 
person or corporation.88  The Gorton bill would have effectively 
stripped the tribes of their FTCA coverage and shifted the cost of 
insuring Self-Determination Act contractors back to the tribes.89  One 
major consequence of the Gorton bill for tort suits would have been 
that the tribes would no longer have been able to take advantage of 
the FTCA’s sweeping protection for discretionary functions and the 
procedural protections of an administrative claims process.90  Critics 
of the Gorton bill suggested that taking the FTCA’s protections away 
from tribal contractors unfairly treated the tribes as contractors 
                                                 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (waiving sovereign immunity for claims involving contracts). 
 87. S. 1691 § 4(a); cf. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (“It is well established that Congress, in the 
exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign 
powers of the Indian tribes.”). 
 88. S. 1691, § 4(a). 
 89. Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity:  Should the Sovereign Control the Purse?, 
24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309, 337–38 (2000) (arguing that “[t]here is no obvious policy 
justification” for removing FTCA coverage from tribal contractors).  As a general 
rule, “an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit 
or the tribe has waived its immunity.”  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 751, 754 (1998).  The Gorton bill would have removed more tribal sovereign 
immunity than would be necessary to pursue tort claims against tribal contractors.  
See Schlosser, supra, at 339 (noting that the Gorton proposal would waive sovereign 
immunity but would not provide any defenses like the FTCA does).  The Gorton bill 
would require the tribes to purchase private insurance like they did in the past.  S. 
1691, § 4; see supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (illustrating that before 1990, 
the tribes could not assert federal sovereign immunity to bar claims against tribal 
contractors and had to purchase private insurance). 
 90. Schlosser, supra note 89, at 339.  See generally FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 47–48 
(explaining the administrative claims process in detail).  The discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA protects the United States from liability where a federal 
employee’s actions involve an element of judgment or choice and those actions are 
based on considerations of public policy.  See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 
536–37 (1988) (establishing the often-cited test for determining whether actions fall 
within the FTCA’s discretionary function exception); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the 
inherent difficulties courts face in applying the FTCA’s discretionary function 
exception to tribal contractors). 
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rather than as sovereign nations.91  Congress never adopted Senator 
Gorton’s bill.92 
In the same year, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, 
himself a Native American,93 introduced the Indian Tribal Conflict 
Resolution and Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 1998, which 
took a different approach to addressing issues relating to liability 
coverage for tribal contractors.94  Unlike the Gorton bill, the 
Campbell bill did not take any sovereign immunity away from the 
tribes and dealt only with delineating what would be covered by the 
FTCA and what would be covered by private insurance.95  The 
Campbell bill aimed to provide tort victims with a remedy in 
instances that were not covered by the FTCA.96  The Campbell bill 
required the BIA to obtain insurance coverage for functions not 
covered by the FTCA and to provide yearly updates to Congress.97  
Congress never passed the Campbell bill directly, but portions of the 
bill requiring the Secretary to study tort liability issues relating to 
tribal contractors passed as part of an omnibus appropriations bill.98  
The Secretary of the Interior was unable to complete the required 
liability study on time.99  Ultimately, the Campbell bill resulted in a 
2000 Government Accounting Office100 (GAO) report and also a 
                                                 
 91. See Sovereign Immunity:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th 
Cong. 3 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Senate Tribal Sovereign Immunity Hearing] (statement 
of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) (suggesting 
that the Gorton bill would overturn years of precedent and relegate the tribes from 
government status to private person or corporate status); Schlosser, supra note 89, at 
339 (arguing that the Gorton bill did not treat the tribes as fairly as the federal and 
state governments did). 
 92. See Schlosser, supra note 89, at 355 (describing the Gorton proposal as a 
“legislative attack[]” on tribal sovereign immunity but noting that it failed). 
 93. Jody Hope Strogoff & Ernest Luning, InnerView with Ben Nighthorse Campbell, 
COLO. STATESMAN (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/ 
992685-innerview-ben-nighthorse-campbell. 
 94. S. 2097, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 95. Compare S. 2097 § 201(b) (requiring better coordination between the tribes 
and the United States to avoid duplicative costs), with American Indian Equal Justice 
Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998) (abrogating tribal sovereign immunity 
completely). 
 96. See 105 CONG. REC. 9867 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell) (noting that the tribes already have insurance and that there is a 
possibility of redundancy with FTCA coverage). 
 97. S. 2097 §§ 201(b)(1), 202(b).  This insurance policy must contain a provision 
that the insurance carrier will not invoke tribal sovereign immunity as a defense.  Id. 
§ 201 (c)(1). 
 98. Indian Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-277, § 704, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-336. 
 99. See Schlosser, supra note 89, at 348 (disparaging the Interior Secretary’s 
failure to produce a report by its 1999 deadline). 
 100. The GAO is now called the Government Accountability Office.  See GAO 
Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, § 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 814. 
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report from the BIA, which the agencies presented to Congress in a 
hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.101 
The BIA report concluded that the tribes find FTCA coverage to be 
limited and overly complex.102  The BIA found that even under the 
most expansive reading, the FTCA would not cover all tribal 
contractor activities.103  Therefore, the tribes still carry liability 
insurance to protect themselves from liability incurred in the course 
of carrying out Self-Determination Act contracts, even though this 
cost was precisely what Congress sought to eliminate.104  The BIA 
report recommended that Congress pass additional legislation to 
provide guidance on some of the issues that have arisen in applying 
the FTCA to tribal contractors.105 
The GAO report identified many of the issues discussed in Part II 
of this Comment as problematic, including choice of law, the status of 
tribal law enforcement, and the scope of employment 
determinations.106  The report also suggested a procedural 
problem—that the current statutory scheme lacks a removal 
procedure for claims against tribal contractors filed in tribal courts.107  
The report observed: “Given the tribes’ historical liability for self-
determination programs prior to 1990, their current liability for their 
non-self-determination programs, and the complexity and 
uncertainty of FTCA coverage, it is understandable why some tribes 
may choose to have comprehensive private liability insurance that 
covers all their programs.”108  The GAO report concluded that the 
government should receive the benefit of those private insurance 
policies and recommended that the Secretary of the Interior check 
the status of a tribe’s insurance policy before proceeding with a claim 
under the FTCA.109  The report suggested that when the tribes have 
                                                 
 101. See GAO and BIA Reports on Risk Management and Tort Liability:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 97 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Senate Tribal 
Tort Liability Hearing] (report from the BIA) (revealing the poor response from the 
tribes and the likely futility of continued annual reports). 
 102. Id. at 96. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; see 1987 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing, supra note 57, at 54 
(testimony of William Ron Allen, Chairman, Jamestown Klallam Tribe) (describing 
how paying for insurance creates a major barrier to entering into Self-Determination 
Act contracts and diverts funds needed to carry them out). 
 105. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 87–88 
(characterizing the issues created by covering tribal contractors with the FTCA as 
“[u]nique”). 
 106. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 17–18. 
 107. Id. at 15; see id. at 31 fig.6 (illustrating how the FTCA is “not a perfect fit” for 
tribal contractors because it leaves considerable gaps). 
 108. Id. at 18. 
 109. Id. at 18–19. 
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private insurance that is duplicative with the FTCA, the Secretary of 
the Interior should tender the claims to private insurance 
companies.110  Despite the hearing, Congress ultimately declined to 
pursue legislative changes.111 
Over the years, Congress has addressed issues of Indian self-
determination in a piecemeal way.  Although it has certainly touched 
on some key issues and focused on them for brief periods of time, it 
has failed to adequately assess the ramifications of extending the 
FTCA to tribal contractors.  Using the FTCA rather than private 
insurance to protect contractors from liability was a major policy 
change haphazardly included in an appropriations bill.  The courts, 
the tribes, and the government have been struggling to reach a 
workable solution. 
II. EXTENDING THE FTCA TO CLAIMS AGAINST TRIBAL CONTRACTORS 
IS A POOR FIT 
Courts had established a body of FTCA jurisprudence for over forty 
years before it was hastily extended to cover tribal contractors.  The 
past twenty years have shown that using the FTCA to cover tribal 
contractors has turned out to be the proverbial square peg being 
forced into the round hole.  This section examines the specific 
problems Congress created by using the FTCA in this way.  First, this 
section addresses the theoretical issues behind sovereign immunity 
and the FTCA’s discretionary function protection, exploring the 
bizarre dynamics of having the terms of a waiver of one sovereign’s 
immunity protect another sovereign.  Second, this section discusses 
issues involved in establishing that a federal employee is within the 
scope of his or her employment for FTCA purposes and the 
difficulties created by applying this body of law to the tribes.  Third, 
this section analyzes the FTCA’s strict exclusion of contractors and 
establishes that the tribes are unlike any other exceptions Congress 
or courts have made.  Fourth, this section looks at Indian law 
enforcement and steps that some courts have taken to avoid federal 
liability when tribal officers commit torts.  Finally, this section 
discusses the web of choice-of-law issues raised by the current 
                                                 
 110. Id. at 19 (suggesting that the Secretary should only tender claims to private 
insurers when it is in the best interest of the United States). 
 111. 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 1–2 (statement of 
Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs); see Tribal 
Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (amending 
the Self-Determination Act without addressing private insurance). 
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arrangement and argues that state law rather than tribal law should 
always be used to govern FTCA suits. 
A. Sovereign Immunity:  Extending the FTCA to Tribal Contractors 
Contravenes the Principles of Sovereign Immunity by Having a Waiver of One 
Sovereign’s Immunity Protect Another Sovereign 
The FTCA is a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity.  The tribes, however, have their own sovereign immunity.  
Using the FTCA to cover tribal contractors creates a bizarre situation 
where a waiver of one sovereign’s immunity is being applied to 
another sovereign.  This section will first discuss the theoretical 
problems of that arrangement.  In addition, a key provision of the 
FTCA does not waive federal sovereign immunity for discretionary 
functions.  Having this sweeping protection apply to the tribes makes 
it difficult for courts to reconcile these cases with years of 
discretionary function jurisprudence.  The second part of this section 
discusses the difficulties that the current arrangement creates in 
applying the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. 
1. Theoretical problems 
The current statutory scheme that governs tribal contractors is 
hard to reconcile with the principles that led Congress to pass the 
FTCA.  Specifically, the FTCA is based on the principles of sovereign 
immunity and the idea that the United States can only be sued when 
it consents.112  Courts treat the Indian tribes as “domestic dependent 
nations”113 that possess their own tribal sovereign immunity.114  The 
Supreme Court noted that Congress has abrogated tribal immunity 
through certain laws, such as the Self-Determination Act, which 
authorize limited classes of suits against the tribes.115  The current 
statutory arrangement uses a waiver of the United States’ sovereign 
                                                 
 112. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994). 
 113. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831) (describing 
the relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes as “peculiar”).  See 
generally Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time:  Judicial Minimalism 
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1193–96 (2001) (discussing the early 
development of Indian law in the Supreme Court and the Marshall Court’s 
recognition of the tribes as “pre-constitutional sovereigns”). 
 114. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (explaining that the tribes have their own tribal sovereign 
immunity and cannot be sued absent a “clear waiver by the tribe or congressional 
abrogation”). 
 115. See id. at 510 (observing that although Congress has always been free to waive 
tribal sovereign immunity and has done so for limited classes of suits, it had not done 
so for tax assessment actions like the one brought by Oklahoma against the 
Potawatomi Indians). 
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immunity—the FTCA—to protect the tribes from liability, even 
though the tribes are different sovereigns with their own sovereign 
immunity.116 
Tort law creates incentives for potential defendants to act more 
carefully to avoid lawsuits.117  Extending FTCA coverage to the tribes 
does not create these incentives for tribal contractors because the 
United States, rather than the tribes, actually pays the judgments.118  
Rather, the current arrangement creates a perverse system of 
incentives for tribal contractors not to cooperate with investigations, 
particularly when the tort victim is also a tribal member.119  Lack of 
                                                 
 116. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes 
have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit 
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c) (2006) 
(waiving the defense of tribal sovereign immunity for Self-Determination Act 
contracts); Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing that the Self-Determination Act waives tribal sovereign immunity, 
although not in the instant case, because the plaintiff was not a party to a Self-
Determination Act contract).  The FTCA waives the federal government’s immunity 
for tort suits but provides a number of exceptions that are used as defenses.  Meyer, 
510 U.S. at 475.  Under the current arrangement, tribal employees are able to take 
advantage of FTCA exceptions originally designed to protect the federal 
government.  See, e.g., Hinsley v. Standing Rock Child Protective Servs., 516 F.3d 668, 
672 (8th Cir. 2008) (using the FTCA’s discretionary function exception to protect a 
tribal social services agency from a negligence claim where it placed a child with a 
history of sexually abusing others in a foster home with no warning to the new foster 
parents). 
 117. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends 
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:  i.e., whether B < PL.”); VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1 
(12th ed. 2010) (identifying deterrence of wrongful conduct and encouragement of 
socially responsible behavior as two of the major purposes of tort law); Jonathan 
Turley, Pax Militaris:  The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the 
Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2003) (observing that there 
is “little question” that increasing liability will influence a rational actor’s conduct).  
But see Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres:  An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
393, 463–64 (2010) (asserting that government agencies are not responsive to 
financial deterrence because they do not pay FTCA settlements in excess of $2500). 
 118. See FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 76–77 (noting that all FTCA judgments against 
the government are paid out of the Judgment Fund).  Because the tribes would have 
no financial consequences for their torts there would be little incentive to act more 
carefully.  See Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Daniel K. 
Inouye, supra note 57, at 60 (“To relieve contractors from responsibility for their 
conduct without being able to control that conduct completely defeats the deterrent 
value of the fault-based tort compensation system.”). 
 119. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 19 (noting that the federal 
government is ultimately liable for FTCA claims, and that some contractors refused 
to cooperate with investigations); Letter from Edward B. Cohen, Acting Solicitor, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Jim Wells, Director, Energy, Resources, and Science 
Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office at 2 (July 20, 2000), in 2000 GAO REPORT, supra 
note 56, at 37 (observing a lack of incentives for loss reduction among tribal 
contractors and occasional uncooperativeness from the tribes and their contractors). 
There is no way to know whether the tribes cooperated in specific reported cases, 
although presumably it would be difficult for the United States to go to trial without 
GROSS.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:50 PM 
2012] HELP ME HELP YOU 403 
cooperation makes it difficult for the United States to assert a 
vigorous defense and could increase the amount of settlements and 
judgments paid.120 
Furthermore, even though the tribes receive FTCA coverage, they 
often carry private liability insurance too, which in some instances is 
paid for with federal contract support funds and provides duplicative 
coverage with the FTCA.121  There is currently no mechanism in place 
to determine where this private coverage overlaps with liability that is 
covered by the FTCA.122  Because the government pays out FTCA 
judgments virtually automatically through the Judgment Fund, 
plaintiffs may choose to pursue an FTCA claim rather than a claim 
against the insurance company.123 
In addition, the insurance companies get paid for policies, portions 
of which would likely never be triggered because these provisions are 
duplicative with FTCA coverage and have little incentive to make the 
system more efficient.124  Rather than streamlining the process of 
insuring tribal contractors, Congress has created a system full of 
perverse incentives and duplicative costs that conflicts with the 
principles on which the FTCA is based. 
                                                 
tribal cooperation.  See, e.g., Challinor v. United States, No. CV-11-3099-EFS, 2012 WL 
523673, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2012) (commenting that it was unclear whether 
the tribal contractor had investigated the accident and suggesting that the tribe 
blocked Occupational Safety and Health Agency access to the accident site, 
compromising the investigation). 
 120. See, e.g., Challinor, 2012 WL 523673, at *1 (discussing how a tribe’s lack of 
cooperation undermined the government’s investigation); cf. 2000 GAO REPORT, 
supra note 56, at 19–20 (suggesting that instances of lack of cooperation appear to be 
isolated but noting that the precise extent of the problem is unclear because no 
agency tracks these claims). 
 121. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 16 (describing this situation as one 
where the federal government is “paying twice”). 
 122. Id. at 19. 
 123. The Judgment Fund is a “permanent, indefinite appropriation” that 
Congress created to pay judgments and settlements against the United States.  
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2193 n.8 (2012) (quoting 31 
C.F.R. § 256.1 (2011)); see 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (specifying 
appropriate instances, including FTCA cases, where the Judgment Fund can be 
used).  The Judgment Fund makes it easy for successful plaintiffs to collect.  FIGLEY, 
supra note 20, at 144–45 (demonstrating the paltry amount of paperwork to be filed 
to receive automatic payment from the Judgment Fund).  Before creation of the 
Judgment Fund, Congress had to appropriate individual sums to pay judgments to 
comply with the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 
7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law”); FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 75–76 (discussing the 
reasons why Congress created the Judgment Fund). 
 124. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that the tribes commonly 
carry private insurance covering activities also covered under the FTCA). 
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2. The discretionary function exception 
The convoluted theoretical problems behind extending the FTCA 
to tribal contractors make it difficult for courts to apply the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exception in a consistent and meaningful way.  
Although the FTCA waives large portions of the United States’ 
sovereign immunity, Congress was careful in reserving protection for 
discretionary functions carried out by employees of the United States 
acting within the scope of their employment.125  In passing the FTCA, 
Congress sought to waive the United States’ immunity for ordinary 
common law torts committed by federal employees rather than to 
authorize new liability based on uniquely governmental functions.126  
The Supreme Court has observed that protection for the 
government’s discretionary activities has a long history in American 
jurisprudence.127  As such, Congress did not intend for the FTCA to 
allow suits to test the validity of the government’s discretion.128  The 
Supreme Court characterized the discretionary function exception as 
“mark[ing] the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose 
tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain 
governmental activities from exposure to suit by private 
individuals.”129 
In examining if the discretionary function shields the United States 
from liability for certain actions, courts consider whether (1) the 
challenged conduct involved an element of choice, and (2) the 
challenged conduct involved the kind of choice Congress meant to 
protect in enacting the discretionary function exception.130  The first 
prong of the test has a fairly straightforward application.131  In 
clarifying the second prong, the Supreme Court held that the 
challenged conduct must be undertaken in furtherance of public 
policy goals.132 
                                                 
 125. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); see United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808–09 (1984) (recounting the legislative 
history of the FTCA’s discretionary function provision). 
 126. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 n.19 (1953) (observing that 
“congressional thought was centered on granting relief for the run-of-the-mine 
accidents, as distinguished from injury from performing discretionary governmental 
functions”). 
 127. See id. at 34 (describing the concept of discretionary function protection as “a 
concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law”). 
 128. Id. at 30 (noting that discretionary function protection applies even when 
discretionary acts are negligently performed and involve an abuse of discretion). 
 129. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808. 
 130. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988). 
 131. See id. (declaring that “conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an 
element of judgment or choice”). 
 132. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991) (reasoning that, in 
light of the discretionary function’s purpose to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of 
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The types of conduct protected by the discretionary function 
exception vary widely, from presidential decisions on issues of 
national security to a decision made by a park ranger in directing 
visitors around a moose.133  In United States v. Gaubert,134 the Court 
found the exception to protect the government from liability for 
decisions made by regulators of a savings and loan association.135  The 
exception applied even though the decisions themselves were at the 
day-to-day operational level rather than being large-scale policy 
decisions.136  Critics suggest that the exception is too broad and, in 
practice, has swallowed the rule by creating a broad category of cases 
where the government is immune from suit despite the FTCA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity.137 
Because courts must consider tribal contractors to be federal 
employees under the Self-Determination Act, they too can invoke the 
                                                 
legislative and administrative decisions,” the proper construction of the exception 
only protects government actions or “decisions based on considerations of public 
policy” (quoting Berkovitz et al. v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988); Varig Airlines, 
467 U.S. at 814)). 
 133. Compare Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 321–22 (D.D.C. 1988) 
(declining to find the United States liable for damages related to President Reagan’s 
decision ordering air strikes on Libya), with Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 
1199 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that a park ranger directing snowmobile riders 
around a moose was exercising a discretionary function and therefore was immune 
when a rider suffered an injury).  See generally Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal 
Tort Claims Act:  A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1123–25 
(2009) (characterizing the discretionary function as the most important one in the 
FTCA, and giving annotated examples of instances where courts have relied on the 
discretionary function exception to bar liability). 
 134. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
 135. Id. at 331, 334. 
 136. See id. at 325 (“Day-to-day management of banking affairs, like the 
management of other businesses, regularly requires judgment as to which of a range 
of permissible courses is the wisest.”). 
 137. E.g., Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424–25 (10th Cir. 1987) (McKay, 
J., concurring) (“[T]wo hundred years after we threw out King George III, the rule 
that ‘the king can do no wrong’ still prevails at the federal level in all but the most 
trivial of matters. . . . [T]he [FTCA] . . . is largely a false promise in all but ‘fender 
benders’ and perhaps some cases involving medical malpractice by government 
doctors.”).  Numerous commentators have called for changes to the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exception.  See, e.g., Marc C. Niles, “Nothing but Mischief”:  The 
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 
1335 (2002) (“The discretionary function exception should apply to limit federal 
tort liability only in those rare circumstances when courts are called upon to 
adjudicate claims that require them to second guess discretionary policy decisions of 
the kind that should be left to political branches, or which call on courts to make the 
kinds of decisions that they are not equipped to make.”); Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, 
Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions:  A Proposal To Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 444 (2012) (advocating for complete repeal of the 
discretionary function provision); James R. Levine, Note, The Federal Tort Claims 
Act:  A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1554 (2000) 
(proposing replacing the FTCA with an administrative agency tasked solely with 
resolving tort claims). 
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broad protections of the discretionary function the same way an 
employee of a federal agency such as the BIA could.138  As a result, 
one sovereign gets to make policy decisions for another without 
risking liability.139  Other government contractors do not get this 
broad protection while carrying out government contracts.140  By 
deeming tribal contractors to be federal employees, Congress has 
added an extra layer to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. 
The tribes can invoke the United States’ protection under the 
discretionary function exception even for blatant negligence as long 
as there is an element of choice involved in their conduct because 
courts generally find contracts to be in furtherance of policy goals 
such as tribal self-determination.141  The discretionary function is a 
powerful shield that should not be applied haphazardly.142  Unlike 
federal employees, tribal contractors can invoke the discretionary 
function exception even where the federal government did not hire 
                                                 
 138. See Hart v. United States, 630 F.3d 1085, 1090–91 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying 
the discretionary function to preclude liability where a BIA officer allowed a suspect 
to go back into his house before taking him to the police station and the suspect 
committed suicide while inside the house); Big Owl v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 
1304, 1309 (D.S.D. 1997) (finding a tribal school board’s decision not to renew a 
kindergarten teacher’s contract to be based on considerations of public policy and 
protected by the discretionary function exception).  The teacher in Big Owl was 
working pursuant to a contract under the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-297, §§ 5201–5212, 102 Stat. 130, 385–95 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2501–2511 (2006)), which Congress passed to supplement the Self-
Determination Act.  Big Owl, 961 F. Supp. at 1307.  Employees working pursuant to 
that act are also deemed to be federal employees for FTCA purposes just like tribal 
employees working under Self-Determination Act contracts.  Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Hinsley v. Standing Rock Child Protective Servs., 516 F.3d 668, 673 
(8th Cir. 2008) (using the discretionary function exception to bar a claim against a 
tribal child protective services department employee who placed a child with a 
history of molesting other children in a foster home without warning the foster 
parents). 
 140. See infra Part II.C (discussing the FTCA’s bar against federal government 
liability for contractor torts). 
 141. See, e.g., Hinsley, 516 F.3d at 673 (identifying the juvenile’s interest in 
confidentiality as a public policy concern and barring a negligence claim when tribal 
child protective services placed a juvenile who was a known molester into a foster 
home without warning the family); Red Elk ex rel. Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 
1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a negligent hiring claim when a tribe-employed 
police officer with a criminal record and history of alcohol abuse raped a minor 
while on duty); Locke v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1045 (D.S.D. 2002) 
(denying a negligent hiring claim based on the discretionary function when a tribal 
police officer assaulted a dispatcher), aff’d per curiam, 63 F. App’x 971 (8th Cir. 
2003); Val-U Constr. Co. of S.D. v. United States, 905 F. Supp. 728, 737 (D.S.D. 1995) 
(finding hiring and firing of subcontractors under a Self-Determination Act contract 
to be protected by the discretionary function exception and noting that Self-
Determination Act contracts are firmly grounded in policy). 
 142. Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:  Sovereignty, Immunity, and 
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 564 (2003) (describing the 
discretionary function exception as the most important FTCA exception and noting 
the expansive reading the Supreme Court has given it). 
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them and has little-to-no involvement in their activities.143  The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) wields the power of the discretionary 
function exception carefully to protect the kinds of policy choices 
Congress had in mind when passing the FTCA.144  Courts have little 
guidance in applying the discretionary function exception to tribal 
contracting because Congress’s extension of the FTCA to the tribes is 
fundamentally incompatible with the discretionary function 
exception.145  Congress left little legislative history with the extension 
of the FTCA and courts essentially must make an unguided choice.146  
This result leads to uncertainty for the tribes as to what will be 
covered, which defeats the primary purpose of extending the FTCA 
to tribal contractors.147 
Replacing FTCA coverage with subsidized private insurance would 
prevent courts from having to determine whether certain functions 
were the kind that Congress meant to protect,148 a determination that 
courts currently struggle with due to the different policy 
considerations behind the FTCA and the Self-Determination Act.149  
                                                 
 143. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, No. 3:09-CV-08033-JWS, 2011 WL 285860, at 
*9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2011) (suggesting that the discretionary function exception 
would have barred the claim of negligent hiring of a tribal police officer who drank 
on the job before causing a major car accident); see also Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691, 696 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that although 
tribal police officers working under Self-Determination Act contracts are considered 
federal employees, the BIA has no authority to supervise day-to-day activities). 
 144. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2245, at 10 (1942) (“Nor is it desirable or intended that 
the constitutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or regulation should be 
tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort.”). 
 145. Congress expressly excluded contractors from the FTCA.  28 U.S.C. § 2671 
(2006); see Statement on Signing Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559 (Nov. 5, 1990) (noting the 
contradiction between the purpose of tribal self-determination and the FTCA 
practice of granting immunity to contractors only when under strict government 
supervision). 
 146. See supra Part I.C (discussing the legislative history of the extension of the 
FTCA to tribal contractors and suggesting that practical considerations regarding 
costs to the tribes drove the decision, which seemed to gloss over any possible legal 
issues that could come with this kind of extension of the FTCA). 
 147. See Marlys Bear Med. v. United States ex rel. Sec’y of the Interior, 241 F.3d 
1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing individual actions performed under a Self-
Determination Act contract and finding some to be covered by the discretionary 
function and others not); see also infra note 203 and accompanying text (contending 
that uncertainty in coverage often leads the tribes to purchase private liability 
insurance in case the FTCA does not cover them, even though Congress sought to 
save the tribes from incurring this cost). 
 148. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991) (suggesting that to 
be eligible for protection under the FTCA, conduct must be the kind Congress 
sought to protect). 
 149. Congress passed the Self-Determination Act to give the tribes the tools 
needed to achieve increased independence in governance.  S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 13 
(1974).  When Congress extended the FTCA to tribal contractors, it gave no 
guidance on how to reconcile the objectives of tribal self-governance with the FTCA’s 
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The tribes would still have authority over their own members and 
would be free to pass their own laws protecting discretionary 
functions for torts committed against tribal members.150 
B. Scope of Employment:  Applying the FTCA to Tribal Contractors Makes It 
Difficult To Determine if Tribal Employees Are Acting Within the Scope of 
Employment 
The FTCA only waives the government’s sovereign immunity when 
a tort is committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of 
his or her employment.151  Pursuant to the Westfall Act,152 if the DOJ 
investigates and, if satisfied, certifies that an alleged employee 
tortfeasor acted within the scope of his or her employment, the 
United States substitutes itself as the defendant.153  If the DOJ declines 
to certify that the tortfeasor acted within the scope of his or her 
employment, the tortfeasor can challenge this determination in 
federal court.154 
Because the FTCA incorporates state law as the law of the place in 
tort suits,155 some variation is to be expected among the jurisdictions 
as courts use state law to determine scope of employment.156  Still, 
deeming Indian contractors to be federal employees is problematic.  
This section will explore the difficulties of making the scope-of-
employment determination for tribal contractors by first exploring 
                                                 
limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity.  Statement on Signing Department of 
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 
1559 (Nov. 5, 1990) (noting the fundamental inconsistencies between the FTCA and 
its application to tribal contractors). 
 150. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (finding the sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe not to extend to nonmembers except in protecting tribal 
government or controlling tribal relations). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
 152. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 
2674, 2679 (2006)). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). 
 154. Id. § 2679(d)(3); see Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424–25 
(1995) (resolving a circuit split to hold that Congress intended these certifications to 
be reviewable in federal court regardless of whether the DOJ certifies that the 
employee is within the scope of employment). 
 155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (stating that the correct law to be applied in the 
FTCA is the “law of the place” of the wrong); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 
(1994)(observing that courts have consistently found state law to be the applicable 
law in FTCA cases). 
 156. See, e.g., Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) (interpreting a vicarious provision of the Restatement of Agency under South 
Dakota law to determine whether a tribal police officer was acting within the scope of 
his employment when he raped a young woman he picked up); Mentz v. United 
States, 359 F. Supp. 2d 856, 861 (D.N.D. 2005) (looking to the Second Restatement 
of Agency under North Dakota law to determine whether a tribal school employee 
was acting in the scope of his employment under North Dakota law). 
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the difficulties in applying these concepts to the tribes, which often 
are structured in ways unlike the federal government.  Next this 
section will examine the role of Indian country and the potential 
problems it could create. 
1. Non-traditional tribal employees 
Non-traditional tribal employment situations make it difficult to 
consistently determine whether tribal contractors are acting within 
the scope of employment.  Frequently, the tribes have different 
organizational structures than government agencies,157 and federal 
courts lack analogous FTCA cases.158  Sometimes, for example, 
members of the tribal council seek to be covered as employees of the 
government.159  The DOJ addresses these situations on a case-by-case 
basis, but some tribes have accused it of having a blanket policy of 
denying certification that tribal council members are acting within 
the scope of their employment.160 
In some situations, tribal leaders serve in multiple capacities, 
making it difficult for courts to determine if the alleged tortfeasors 
are acting within the scope of employment.  In Big Crow v. Rattling 
Leaf,161 for example, Robert Rattling Leaf served as the Rosebud 
Sioux’s Director of Natural Resources, but he was also commissioned 
as a law enforcement officer.162  Rattling Leaf responded to a law 
enforcement call on his radio, and, in the process, caused a fatal car 
accident.163  The district court overturned the DOJ’s refusal to certify 
him as a federal employee.164  The court found him to be acting as a 
federal employee within the scope of his employment even though 
                                                 
 157. See Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law:  Why State Choice-of-Law Principles 
Should Apply To Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1689 (2006) 
(suggesting that tribal courts get a cultural benefit from having their own practices 
and procedures that may be different from those in state or federal courts). 
 158. See, e.g., Big Crow v. Rattling Leaf, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1069 (D.S.D. 2004) 
(observing that a precise issue of tribal employment involving a tribal leader was one 
of first impression). 
 159. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 8–9 (statement 
of Ethan M. Posner, Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen.) (suggesting that this determination is 
very fact-specific). 
 160. See id. at 20–21 (defending the DOJ against charges that it had a blanket 
policy of refusing to certify members of the tribal council when they are involved in 
an FTCA claim).  Deputy Associate Attorney General Posner’s statement alludes to a 
case in Nebraska in which the DOJ refused to certify some tribal council members as 
within the scope of employment.  Id.  The statement does not address the case by 
name and it did not yield a reported decision, perhaps because the plaintiff found 
little utility in pursuing an individual capacity suit. 
 161. 296 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D.S.D. 2004). 
 162. Id. at 1069. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1070–71. 
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the tribe had several different Self-Determination Act contracts and 
Rattling Leaf was not technically hired by or paid under the contract 
to provide law enforcement services.165  Cases like Big Crow show the 
operational difficulties that courts encounter when determining 
tribal contractor scope of employment; and policy considerations, 
rather than a strict reading of the relevant laws, may weigh heavily on 
courts faced with these situations.166 
In other cases where courts struggle in applying the FTCA to tribal 
contractors, tribal employees have non-traditional roles.  In Adams v. 
Tunmore,167 a federal district court found a Jesuit volunteer given a 
small monthly stipend through the tribe’s general fund to be a 
federal employee because the court determined she was carrying out 
part of a tribal school’s grant when she caused a car accident.168  The 
tribe furnished her with a vehicle and she assisted with educational 
programs at the tribal school.169  The court overturned the 
government’s denial to certify her as an employee and found her to 
be within the scope of her employment when she crashed the car 
near the school while “finish[ing] up preparations” to leave the 
reservation.170  This decision is dubious because it considers the 
source of the volunteer’s payment to be irrelevant.171  The Adams 
decision illustrates the difficulties of determining the scope of 
employment in the tribal context because state tort law lacked 
analogues to this kind of employment arrangement. 
                                                 
 165. Id. at 1070 (“It was obviously, if nothing else, the ‘custom’ and a ‘procedure’ 
of the Tribe to have [Rattling Leaf] assist other law enforcement officers operating 
under the 638 contract. . . .  No requirement can be found in statute, regulation, or 
contract to the effect that a tribal employee paid under one self-determination 
contract cannot be performing functions under another self-determination 
contract.”). 
 166. See id. (taking judicial notice that Indian reservations often lack properly 
trained law enforcement officers). 
 167. No. CV-05-270-FVS, 2006 WL 2591272 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2006). 
 168. See id. at *3 (noting that tribal school employees get the same FTCA 
protections as tribal contractors working pursuant to Self-Determination Act 
contracts). 
 169. See id. at *1 (noting that the volunteer assisted with reading, art, and soccer). 
 170. See id. at *4 (finding this situation to fall under an exception to the general 
“coming and going” rule because she was driving a company car). 
 171. Id. at *3 (citing Big Crow v. Rattling Leaf, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (D.S.D. 
2004)).  In Big Crow, however, there were two separate Self-Determination Act 
contracts and it was customary for the officer to be paid under one and assist in 
performance of the other.  296 F. Supp. 2d at 1069–70.  In Adams, the volunteer was 
paid a stipend out of the tribe’s general fund, which does not come from the federal 
government.  2006 WL 2591272, at *3.  Had the court ruled the other way in Adams, 
a volunteer could have been liable for a large damages award. 
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A few tribes are structured like the federal government,172 but the 
Self-Determination Act does not require them to be,173 and as a result, 
courts and the DOJ struggle to determine when the FTCA covers 
tribal contractors.174  In some cases, courts seem willing to override 
the DOJ’s certification and let policy considerations create a very 
broad scope of employment for indirect tribal employees.175  Adding 
an extra layer to the scope of employment issue by including the 
tribes makes applying any state’s test difficult, however, because the 
employees are only employees of the federal government as a result 
of a statutorily codified legal fiction.176  Extending the FTCA to tribal 
contractors makes it difficult for courts to apply state scope-of-
employment law with any regularity, thereby creating more 
uncertainty in whether tribal employees involved in specific actions 
will be covered, which undermines the purpose of extending the 
FTCA to the tribes.177  If the tribes cannot be confident that their 
employees carrying out Self-Determination Act contracts will be 
covered under the FTCA, savvy tribes will purchase liability insurance 
to protect themselves from the risk of tort liability.178  In extending 
the FTCA, however, Congress sought to eliminate the burden of the 
tribes buying private insurance.179  Due to this confusion, 
sophisticated tribes wanting to protect themselves from liability are 
no better off than they were before Congress started this experiment 
with the FTCA.180 
                                                 
 172. See, e.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1 (2009) (creating three branches 
of government—executive, judicial, and legislative). 
 173. See Florey, supra note 157, at 1689 (suggesting that the tribes get a cultural 
benefit by not completely conforming their legal systems to western practice). 
 174. Adams, 2006 WL 2591272, at *4 (relying on an exception to the general 
“coming and going” rule instead of delving into the complexities of tribal 
contracting law). 
 175. See, e.g., Big Crow, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71 (citing the Attorney General’s 
refusal to certify the tribal Natural Resources Director as within the scope of his 
employment while responding to law enforcement call as an example of the maxim 
“[n]o good deed goes unpunished”); see also Garcia v. United States, No. Civ. 08-
0295 JB/WDS, 2010 WL 2977611, at *17–19 (D.N.M. June 15, 2010) (finding an off-
duty tribal police officer to be within the scope of employment when he intervened 
in a physical altercation at a family wedding because the wedding guests knew he was 
a police officer and expected him to intervene and he was to report to work only two 
hours later). 
 176. See Big Crow, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1068–69 (discussing the statutory scheme 
governing tribal contracting). 
 177. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 34 (identifying the lack of clear 
guidance in the Self-Determination Act as to which tribal employees are covered as a 
problem in the statutory scheme). 
 178. See id. at 18 (noting that many tribes still carry private liability insurance). 
 179. See supra Part I.C (discussing the history of the Self-Determination Act). 
 180. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 10 (statement of 
Michael Willis, Hobbs, Straus, Dean and Walker Law Offices) (suggesting that 
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2. Indian country 
The FTCA only applies to federal employees acting within the 
scope of employment.181  Self-Determination Act contracts are 
generally carried out in Indian country.182  Defining the scope of 
Indian country is a complex and thorny issue that has not been 
entirely resolved.183  Questions about the boundaries of Indian 
country could add a great deal of uncertainty to a court’s 
determination of whether a tribal contractor is acting within the 
scope of employment.  Although the government has not yet litigated 
this strategy, this section serves as a warning of a future problem 
looming on the horizon. 
The relevant statutes governing tribal contracting generally apply 
to services provided in “Indian country,” which is a term of art in 
Indian law.184  Federal law generally defines Indian country as “land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation,” “dependent Indian 
communities” whether within a tribe’s original or subsequently 
acquired territory, and “Indian allotments.”185  Even though Indian 
country has a standardized statutory definition, the boundaries of 
                                                 
insurance companies do not lower their rates to account for areas already covered by 
the FTCA). 
 181. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 423 (1995) (describing 
scope of employment as the dividing line between suits against the federal 
government under the FTCA and individual capacity suits against government 
employees). 
 182. The Self-Determination Act sought to turn over to the tribes programs 
previously being run by the BIA.  S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 13 (1974).  Initially the BIA 
claimed that it provided services only on Indian reservations based on provisions in 
its manual, but in practice provided them to Indian communities near reservations, 
too.  Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 210–11 (1974).  These “dependent Indian 
communities” living near reservations have now been codified as part of “Indian 
country” and are served by the BIA.  18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).  The boundaries of 
Indian country are especially important in contracts for law enforcement.  See 25 
U.S.C. § 2802(a) (noting that ILERA applies to law enforcement in Indian country).  
Whether an officer is within Indian country could affect the determination of 
whether he is within the scope of employment.  See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, No. 
3:09-CV-08033 JWS, 2011 WL 285860, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2011) (noting that a 
provision in the Self-Determination Act contract under which the officer was hired 
specified that officers were always considered to be on duty while they were in Indian 
country). 
 183. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 579, 599–602 (2008) (decrying the current state of the Supreme Court’s Indian 
law decisions and suggesting that the Court drastically redefine Indian country); 
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country:  A State Offensive To Divest Tribal 
Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1995) (claiming that the amount of Indian 
country is shrinking); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law 
Decisions:  Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox 
Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 473 (2003) (suggesting that the statute defining 
Indian country is merely an attempt to describe Indian lands as an incoherent 
“checkerboard” pattern of Indian lands). 
 184. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
 185. Id. 
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Indian country are not always clear in practice, as is particularly true 
in Alaska, Oklahoma, and areas in the country where Indian and non-
Indian lands form a “checkerboard” pattern.186  For example, unlike 
all other states, tribal land in Alaska is divided between native 
corporations.187  The unique situation in Alaska means there is little 
or no Indian country left in that state,188 even though there is a 
significant native population.189  As a result, the BIA enters into Self-
Determination Act contracts with Alaska native tribes.190  The status of 
Indian country in Alaska remains unsettled.191  In Oklahoma there is 
also a debate over the scope of Indian country.192 
                                                 
 186. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 532 (1998) 
(suggesting that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-
203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2006)), 
which converted reservations to native corporations, showed Congress’s intent to set 
aside tribal lands which diminishes Indian country); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox 
Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124 (1993) (acknowledging the argument that there may be no 
more reservations in Oklahoma based on an 1891 treaty, but still finding there to be 
Indian country); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty:  Illuminating the Paradox of 
the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1185 (2004) (describing the 
pattern of Indian and non-Indian lands in New Mexico as a “checkerboard” and 
noting that the result has been longstanding disputes over jurisdiction between the 
state and the tribes).  See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra 
note 46, § 4.07 (discussing the historical status of Indian country in Oklahoma and 
Alaska). 
 187. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523 (concluding that 1.8 million acres of land in 
northern Alaska is not Indian country); see also Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. 
Osborne, “Indian Country” and the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 
22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2005) (providing background on the ANCSA and the 
current status of Indian country in Alaska). 
 188. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 & n.2 (commenting that with the exception of the 
Annette Island Reserve, there are no Indian reservations in Alaska); Strommer & 
Osborne, supra note 187, at 5 (stating that the ANCSA “extinguished” most Indian 
country in Alaska); cf. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999) (suggesting 
that although Congress may have extinguished most of Indian country in Alaska, it 
did not extinguish all powers the tribes possess as sovereigns). 
 189. See RESEARCH & ANALYSIS SECTION, ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., 
ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW:  2010 CENSUS AND 2011 ESTIMATES 12 & tbl.1.4 (2012), 
available at http://almis.labor.state.ak.us/pop/estimates/pub/popover.pdf 
(reporting that American Indian and Alaska natives constituted 17% of the Alaskan 
population in 2010). 
 190. See 2008 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing, supra note 68, at 2 (statement of 
Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) (noting the 
prevalence of self-governance programs among Alaskan tribes). 
 191. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 205, 124 
Stat 2258, 2264 (including an explicit provision that nothing in the bill alters the 
jurisdiction of the state of Alaska, rather than clearly defining what constitutes Indian 
country there). 
 192. See Kirke Kickingbird, “Way Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony 
Cross the Reservation!” from “Oklahoma Hills” by Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA L.J. 303, 328–30 
(1993) (addressing the survey that reported that the state had no reservations and 
Congress’s subsequent decision to follow the survey’s recommendation of 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations); Angela M. Risenhoover, Note, Reservation 
Disestablishment:  The Undecided Issue in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox 
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Further complicating the matter, the Supreme Court has 
recognized Indian country as extending to dependent Indian 
communities living off of established reservations.193  Dependent 
Indian communities are now included in the statutory definition of 
Indian country.194  The Supreme Court has established a two-part test 
for determining whether tribal areas are dependent Indian 
communities:  The tribe must show the land is a federal set-aside and 
that it is under federal superintendence.195 
Self-Determination Act contracts let the tribes take over services 
formerly provided by the BIA in Indian country.  If an employee was 
outside Indian country, he or she could be outside the scope of the 
contract and therefore outside the scope of his or her employment.  
The DOJ could then refuse to certify the person as within the scope 
of his or her employment and the United States would not be 
substituted as the defendant.196  If the DOJ does not certify the 
employee in question as being within the scope of employment, the 
plaintiff can either proceed with an individual capacity suit or 
challenge the determination in federal court.197  Furthermore, taken 
to its logical end, a court could find certain Self-Determination Act 
contracts to be void if they are performed outside of Indian country 
when doing so is unauthorized by statute.198 
Critics might argue that taking such a position would violate the 
canon of statutory construction that courts should interpret laws in 
favor of Indians when the law is not clear.199  Courts reading laws in a 
light favorable to the tribes, however, need not ignore clear 
manifestations of intent.200  Congress has consistently specified that all 
                                                 
Nation, 29 TULSA L.J. 781, 783–85 (1994) (discussing Oklahoma’s history as Indian 
territory and rebutting the argument that there is no Indian country there). 
 193. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 215–16 (1974) (detailing the prevalence of 
Indian communities near but not on the reservation); id. at 229 (refusing to allow 
the BIA to unilaterally amend its policy manual to provide assistance only to 
reservation Indians). 
 194. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
 195. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). 
 196. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 241 (2007) (noting that when the government 
refuses to certify that an employee was within the scope of employment, the Westfall 
Act’s protections do not apply). 
 197. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 419–20 (1995). 
 198. See Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 260 (1934) (stating that no 
contractual rights arise from an ultra vires contract, even though the contract has 
been performed). 
 199. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (describing the Indian 
canon of statutory construction as an “eminently sound and vital canon” (quoting N. 
Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976))). 
 200. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 349 (1998) (clarifying 
that the Indian canon of construction is not “a license to disregard clear expressions 
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statutes governing Indian contracting apply in Indian country.201  The 
government, however, does not always speak with one clear voice and 
the DOJ may determine that clarifying the boundaries of Indian 
country serves the greater goal of self-determination, even if it may 
put the department at odds with another department, or tribes, in a 
particular case. 
Uncertainty about the boundaries of Indian country could call into 
question when tribal contractors are covered under the FTCA.202  This 
uncertainty about Indian country could lead to potential gaps in 
coverage, making it less clear if and when the tribes need to purchase 
private insurance, thus undermining Congress’s purpose in applying 
the FTCA to the tribal contractors.203  The DOJ has not yet refused to 
certify a Self-Determination Act contractor as outside the scope of 
employment based on the boundaries of Indian country, but the lack 
of clarity regarding the boundaries of Indian country could 
foreshadow future problems.204  As the tribes contract for more 
functions under the Self-Determination Act, it seems likely that they 
will push the boundaries of Indian country.205  Therefore these issues 
may arise, making it difficult, if not impossible, for courts to 
determine whether the employee in question was acting within the 
scope of employment.  Congress extended the FTCA to make it easier 
for the tribes to enter into Self-Determination Act contracts, and yet 
Congress may have unwittingly opened the door for complex legal 
battles over coverage. 
                                                 
of tribal and congressional intent” (quoting DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court for the 
Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975))). 
 201. See supra Part I.B–D (discussing the statutes governing tribal contracting and 
tracing their legislative history). 
 202. The tribes already find FTCA coverage to be limited and overly complex.  See 
2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 95 (suggesting that the 
relatively low number of FTCA claims stems from the tribes’ lack of familiarity with 
the existence of both insurance and FTCA claims). 
 203. Cf. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that the tribes often 
purchase private liability insurance).  It would be hard to know when the tribes 
needed to purchase insurance if it is unclear whether tribal contracts outside of 
Indian country are covered by the FTCA. 
 204. Contesting a contractor as being outside the scope of Indian country and 
therefore the scope of employment could be desirable in a particularly blatant case 
of abuse. 
 205. See 2008 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing, supra note 68, at 2 (statement of 
Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) (describing the 
Indian Self-Determination Act contracting as a “success story” and noting that the 
program now includes “over 230 tribes compacting an estimated $350 million for the 
BIA and over 380 tribes and tribal organizations compacting over $1.2 billion within 
the [Indian Health Service]”). 
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C. Contractors:  Covering Tribal Contractors Contravenes the FTCA’s Clear 
and Longstanding Exclusion of Government Contractors 
Applying the FTCA to torts committed by tribal contractors directly 
contravenes the FTCA’s policy barring government liability for torts 
committed by government contractors.206  In passing the FTCA, 
Congress expressly declined to waive the United States’ sovereign 
immunity for claims against government contractors.207  Congress has 
amended the Self-Determination Act to cover torts committed by 
tribal contractors with the FTCA even though the claims would be 
clearly barred otherwise.208  This position is also inconsistent with 
Congress’s treatment of other Indian programs—Congress waived 
the United States’ sovereign immunity for torts arising from Self-
Determination Act contracts, but not for some other programs such 
as those that the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) provides to aid the tribes.209 
Courts can deem a non-Indian contractor to be an employee of the 
United States for FTCA purposes, but only if the government controls 
the detailed physical aspects of the contractor’s operations.  In 
adopting this standard, the Supreme Court set a high bar.210  In United 
States v. Logue,211 for example, private prison guards were found to be 
contractors rather than federal employees even though the prison 
was run according to stringent regulations from the Bureau of 
Prisons.212  The Court found that the FTCA did not cover the prison 
guards because the government did not physically supervise their 
conduct.213  Therefore, on remand, the plaintiffs could only proceed 
against the government under the FTCA for the actions of specific 
                                                 
 206. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006) (excluding contractors from the definition of 
federal agency, thereby placing them outside the reach of the FTCA). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, 
supra note 57, at 60 (describing the DOJ’s continual resistance to applying the FTCA 
to tribal contractors). 
 209. See Comes Flying v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 529, 530 (D.S.D. 1993) 
(denying an FTCA claim where the tribe’s contract with the government is through 
HUD and is not a Self-Determination Act contract). 
 210. See, e.g., Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding 
a civilian doctor working at a Navy hospital to be deemed a government employee 
for FTCA purposes where his contract stated that his “activities shall be subject to 
day-to-day direction by Navy personnel in a manner comparable to the direction over 
Navy uniformed and civil service personnel engaged in comparable work”). 
 211. 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 
 212. Id. at 529–30. 
 213. Id. at 530. 
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agents at the prison who were actual federal employees.214  The 
purpose of tribal contracting, however, is that the federal government 
does not exercise such a high level of control over the tribes.215  As 
such, the United States expressly does not control the day-to-day 
operations of these tribal contractors because doing so would be 
inappropriate and against the policy of Indian self-determination.216 
The question, then, becomes only whether the tribe exercised the 
necessary amount of control to make the contractor an employee of 
the tribe.217  For example, in Necklace v. United States,218 a tribe in South 
Dakota hired Isaac Primeaux to clear ice from a pedestrian walkway.219  
The same day Primeaux was hired, the tribe immediately sent him 
out in a truck towing a flatbed trailer with a skid loader on it.220  That 
day, he was involved in an accident that killed two other motorists.221  
The accident occurred when the trailer disengaged from the pickup 
truck he was driving.222  A court found the worker to be a federal 
                                                 
 214. See Logue v. United States, 488 F.2d 1090, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1974) (per 
curiam) (discussing the Supreme Court’s findings and remanding the case to the 
district court for findings of fact on the negligence of a U.S. deputy marshall). 
 215. See S. REP. NO. 93-682, at 12–13 (1974) (emphasizing the recognition of tribal 
sovereignty and the shift towards self-governance); Statement on Signing 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1558, 1559 (Nov. 5, 1990) (describing the extension of the FTCA to tribal 
contractors as undermining efforts to foster tribal autonomy); see also Letter from 
John R. Bolton, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, supra note 57, at 59–60 
(suggesting that Congress justifies applying the FTCA to tribal contractors based on 
their importance but observing that the same argument could be made about any 
number of other government contractors such as personnel at Veterans 
Administration hospitals). 
 216. See Statement on Signing Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559 (identifying the tension between 
supervision and control, on the one hand, and tribal autonomy, on the other); see, 
e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691, 696 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(observing that although the tribal police officers working pursuant to Self-
Determination Act contracts are considered federal employees for FTCA purposes, 
the BIA has no authority to oversee the day-to-day operations of the officers). 
 217. See Andrade ex rel. Goodman v. United States, No. 05-3240-PHX-MHM, 2008 
WL 4183011, at *8 n.1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2008) (“Because the [Self-Determination Act 
contracts] contemplate that the Colorado River Indian Tribe would administer a 
social services program on behalf of the Federal Government, the issue is not 
whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs exercised sufficient control over [the tribe’s 
Child Protective Services], but whether [the tribe or its social services office] 
exercised control over [the tribe’s Child Protective Services] in a manner consistent 
with that of a principal-agent relationship.”).  In Andrade, the plaintiff alleged that 
the tribe’s social services knew or should have known that two children it placed in 
foster care were dangerous before the abusive children sexually abused another child 
in the foster home.  Id. at *1. 
 218. No. Civ. 06-4274, 2007 WL 3389926 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2007). 
 219. Id. at *1. 
 220. Id. at *3 (noting that all of the equipment used was not owned by the tribal 
entity which had entered into the Self-Determination Act contract). 
 221. Id. at *1. 
 222. Id. 
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employee for FTCA purposes even though he was on his way to clear 
snow from a sidewalk when the Self-Determination Act contract 
provided for road maintenance and the equipment he was using did 
not belong to the tribal road maintenance program.223  The court 
noted that policy considerations favoring tribal contracting played a 
role in its decision.224  The level of control necessary to make a worker 
an employee of a tribal contractor depends on state agency law, but is 
generally much lower than the amount of control the federal 
government must exercise to deem employees of contractors federal 
employees for FTCA purposes.225  In a typical FTCA contractor case 
there would be little question if the person in question was an 
employee of the contractor and the primary issue would be whether 
the government exercised enough control over their performance to 
make them a federal employee.226  Under the current system for tribal 
contractors, the only necessary inquiry is whether the worker is an 
employee of the tribal contractor.227  As a result, within hours of the 
tribe hiring an unskilled laborer in Necklace, the federal government 
was potentially liable for a large judgment. 
Extending FTCA coverage to government contractors even if they 
do not meet the traditional requirements is not entirely 
unprecedented, although it is exceedingly rare.  Congress has also 
extended the FTCA to cover nuclear weapons testing.228  That issue, 
however, involves national security concerns not present with the 
Indian tribes.229  Furthermore, Congress had already agreed to pay 
                                                 
 223. Id. at *5–7. 
 224. See id. at *5–6 (suggesting that the government should give the tribes 
maximum flexibility and remove obstacles to entering into Self-Determination Act 
contracts with the tribes). 
 225. Compare Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530 (1973) (finding a prison 
guard in a federal prison not to be a federal employee for FTCA purposes because 
even though the prison was run according to detailed federal specifications, the 
government did not physically supervise the guards in question), with Necklace, 2007 
WL 3389926, at *1, *7 (holding a tribe member involved in a deadly crash to be an 
employee of the tribe, and thus covered under the FTCA, even though he had been 
hired the morning of the accident and given no training).  After the district court 
ruled that the employee was covered by the FTCA, the United States conceded 
liability for the deadly crash.  Necklace v. United States, No. CIV. 06-4274, 2009 WL 
2191881, at *1 (D.S.D. July 20, 2009). 
 226. Logue, 412 U.S. at 526. 
 227. Necklace, 2007 WL 3389926, at *6–7. 
 228. See 50 U.S.C. § 2783(c) (2006) (providing FTCA coverage to certain nuclear 
weapons testing contractors); see also In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 
820 F.2d 982, 990–91 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the legislative history of the bill 
which extended FTCA protection to nuclear weapons contractors). 
 229. See Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 987 (suggesting that nuclear weapons 
contractors are “instruments of national policy to assist in an entirely governmental 
task—nuclear weapons research”).  Some events, such as nuclear attack, are thought 
to be uninsurable.  See Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns:  The Illusion of 
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judgments against nuclear weapons contractors before extending the 
FTCA to cover them.230  In other limited instances involving national 
security considerations, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
government contractor defense, which is a federal common law 
defense with roots in sovereign immunity.231  The Court, however, 
relied on other doctrines that would not be relevant in the tribal 
context.232 
Courts do apply the FTCA’s contractor exclusion to subcontractors 
working on Self-Determination Act contracts.233  Excluding 
                                                 
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2005) (arguing that insurers do not find it 
profitable to insure “a catastrophic event that causes significant losses across multiple 
‘lines’ of insurance”).  Even though the government did not control the detailed 
physical aspects of the work, Congress justified the extension of the FTCA to the 
nuclear contractors because “[o]nly the government sets policy, makes decisions, 
and controls activities and circumstances regarding atomic weapons testing.”  
Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 987 (citing the legislative history of the extension of 
the FTCA to cover nuclear weapons testing). 
 230. See Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 990–91 (tracing the legislative history of 
the extension of the FTCA to nuclear weapons contractors).  The government would 
have had to pay potential judgments without the ability to assert the FTCA’s 
defenses.  See id. at 991 (noting that in the context of nuclear weapons testing, the 
Feres doctrine and the discretionary function exception would be powerful defenses). 
 231. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988) (holding one 
element of the government contractor defense to be that specifications for military 
equipment were grounded in policy considerations like those protected by the 
discretionary function exception).  But see Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp. and the Government Contractor Defense:  An Analysis Based on the 
Current Circuit Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 687 (1999) 
(suggesting that there is an unresolved circuit split over the extent to which 
government contractors can invoke Boyle to protect themselves from lawsuits). 
 232. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512–13 (displacing state law for claims against 
manufacturers of military equipment when the government approved the design 
with reasonably precise specifications, the equipment met those specifications, and 
the supplier notified the government of all dangers).  This area of the law is not well 
established and has been called into question by subsequent decisions.  See Hercules, 
Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 435 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the 
“contemporaneous legal uncertainty” surrounding Boyle).  For example, the 
evolution of the Boyle doctrine has lead to a conflation of sovereign immunity and 
preemption in the context of military contractors serving overseas, creating 
confusion regarding the appropriate defense and the extent of the government’s 
liability.  See Kathryn R. Johnson, Note, Shields of War:  Defining Military Contractors’ 
Liability for Torture, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1429–31 (2012) (arguing that preemption 
is the appropriate defense because it insulates the government’s legitimate interests 
in military operations from state tort law claims while also preserving a forum for 
contractor actions that exceed legitimate governmental functions covered by the 
FTCA).  The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since the Boyle decision.  See 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1306–07 
(2012) (discussing cases in other circuits that have addressed the issue after Boyle). 
 233. See Demontiney v. U.S. ex rel. Dep’t of Interior, 255 F.3d 801, 808 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding that a subcontractor cannot take advantage of the Self-Determination 
Act because he was not working pursuant to a Self-Determination Act contract); FGS 
Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1234–35 (8th Cir. 1995) (limiting the 
definition of a contractor for Self-Determination Act purposes to the tribes and 
“tribe-related” organizations). 
GROSS.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:50 PM 
420 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:383 
subcontractors presents a significant barrier to recovery for plaintiffs, 
particularly in regards to Indian health centers.234  Indian health 
centers, run pursuant to Self-Determination Act contracts, provide 
important medical care to tribal populations.235  The tribes enter into 
Self-Determination Act contracts to run the health centers, but often 
subcontract out many of the centers’ key functions.236  When these 
subcontractors commit torts, they are generally not covered by the 
FTCA, and therefore claims against the United States are barred 
because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for 
these claims.237  Congress extended the FTCA to cover most tribal 
contractors,238 yet some of the people who could commit the most 
serious torts against tribal members receiving services are not 
covered.239  This situation is not unique to tribal contractors, as the 
complex problem of determining whether certain personnel are 
federal employees or contractors often arises at federal healthcare 
facilities.240  In this instance, applying the FTCA to tribal contractors 
subjects the tribes to the same complexities the federal government 
                                                 
 234. See, e.g., Tsosie v. United States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that a physician at an IHS facility was an independent contractor and therefore that 
the claim was barred by the FTCA even though the health center itself was run 
pursuant to a Self-Determination Act contract); Bernie v. United States, 712 F.2d 
1271, 1273–74 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); see also Wooten v. Hudson, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
1149, 1154 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (finding a doctor to be an employee of the United 
States for FTCA purposes at certain times and an employee of a contractor at other 
times).  But see Bird v. United States, 949 F.2d 1079, 1088 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding a 
nurse to be an employee of the government rather than of a contractor because he 
was acting as an integral part of the operating team when the incident occurred). 
 235. See 2008 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing, supra note 68, at 2 (statement of 
Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) (discussing the 
prevalence of Indian health facilities in Alaska and their importance in providing 
care to hard-to-reach tribal populations). 
 236. See, e.g., Wooten, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52 (noting that the hospital 
contracted out emergency room services, although the subcontractors were required 
to carry malpractice insurance). 
 237. See, e.g., Bernie, 712 F.2d at 1273 (applying the day-to-day control and 
supervision standard from Logue and Orleans to find that doctors were not acting as 
federal employees). 
 238. See supra Part I.C (discussing Congress’s decision to extend the FTCA to tribal 
contractors to avoid having the tribes purchase private liability insurance for each 
Self-Determination Act contract they enter). 
 239. See supra note 234 (exposing the complexities of coverage for subcontractors 
under the FTCA, and providing instances where front-line medical personnel may 
not be covered). 
 240. Compare Creel v. United States, 598 F.3d 210, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding 
an orthopedic surgeon at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital to be an independent 
contractor and therefore dismissing the suit against the United States under the 
FTCA), with Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a 
medical resident in a VA training program was a government employee for FTCA 
purposes rather than an independent contractor even though the hospital did not 
directly employ him). 
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deals with in operating medical facilities, undermining the goal of 
simplifying tort coverage for the tribes. 
By directly contravening the FTCA’s clear statutory bar against 
waiving the United States’ sovereign immunity for torts committed by 
contractors, Congress has created a situation where courts are in the 
untenable position of having to choose between attempting a 
mechanical application of a law that does not really fit the tribal 
contractor context and trying to reconcile the purpose behind it.  
Furthermore, tribal contractors are covered but subcontractors are 
not.241  The result is unsatisfactory because some of the front line 
medical personnel for whom purchasing private insurance would be 
the most expensive are not covered.242  Subcontractors, therefore, 
must purchase liability insurance and presumably pass the costs on to 
the tribes, defeating Congress’s purpose of reducing costs for the 
tribe to enter into Self-Determination contracts.243  Congress should 
end the experiment with the FTCA and instead help the tribes buy 
comprehensive private insurance to prevent courts from having to 
apply a law that does not fit the tribal contractors and would make 
tort litigation simpler for both the tribes and tort victims. 
D. Law Enforcement:  FTCA Coverage of Tribal Contractors Makes the 
United States Liable for Some Serious Abuses While Barring Other Actions 
that Would Proceed if a Traditional Federal Employee Injured the Victim 
Applying the FTCA to tribal contractors contravenes the FTCA’s 
treatment of law enforcement officers and intentional torts by 
barring torts that might otherwise be actionable against government 
employees.  Initially, the United States maintained its sovereign 
immunity for all claims for specified intentional torts, but, in 1974, 
Congress amended the FTCA to cover certain intentional torts 
committed by law enforcement officers.244  Congress added this 
provision, referred to as the “law enforcement proviso,” because of 
                                                 
 241. See supra notes 233–237 and accompanying text (addressing the FTCA’s 
applicability to tribal subcontractors).   
 242. See supra note 234 (giving examples of situations where courts use the FTCA 
to bar claims against subcontractors). 
 243. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 10 (statement of 
Michael Willis, Hobbs, Straus, Dean and Walker Law Offices) (lamenting the current 
situation where the tribes still have to buy private liability insurance to insure 
activities not covered by the FTCA but insurers cannot actually reduce costs because 
neither the tribes nor the insurance companies know precisely what is covered under 
the FTCA). 
 244. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)). 
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concerns over aggressive law enforcement raids.245  The law 
enforcement proviso is an exception to the intentional tort 
exception.246  Generally, the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity 
for intentional torts, but the law enforcement proviso waives the 
United States’ sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights,” provided they are 
committed by federal law enforcement officers.247  The statute defines 
a law enforcement officer as “any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 
arrests for violations of Federal law.” 248  Furthermore, in claims not 
covered by the law enforcement proviso, courts have read the FTCA’s 
intentional tort bar to cover claims ultimately sounding in negligence 
but stemming from a battery committed by a government 
employee.249  The general intentional tort exception “does not merely 
bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any 
claim arising out of assault or battery.” 250  Unless the law enforcement 
proviso applies, a plaintiff cannot succeed in an FTCA case for an 
intentional tort, even if the plaintiff tries to recharacterize the 
incident as a negligent tort. 
Tribal law enforcement is an important function for which the 
tribes enter into Self-Determination Act contracts and it generates 
                                                 
 245. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (describing how agents handcuffed the plaintiff in front of 
his family, threatened to arrest his wife and children, searched his apartment 
thoroughly, and eventually interrogated him and conducted a visible strip search).  A 
Bivens suit allows an injured party to bring a lawsuit against a federal officer in his or 
her individual capacity without specific statutory authorization.  6 FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS’ EDITION § 11:244, at 303–04 (West 2004).  Congress created 
the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso as a counterpart to Bivens suits.  S. REP. NO. 93-
588, at 3 (1973). 
 246. FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 34. 
 247. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006). 
 248. Id. 
 249. E.g., Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 444–45 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an FTCA negligence suit under the 
intentional tort exception where a meat inspector, in a prank gone awry, jumped on 
a colleague’s back and caused him to run into meat hooks, finding the incident arose 
out of a battery, despite plaintiff pleading negligence). 
 250. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (plurality opinion); cf. 
Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 395, 403 (1988) (allowing an FTCA 
negligence claim to proceed where government employees at Bethesda Naval 
Medical Center allowed a patient to leave with a loaded rifle which the patient later 
used to fire at passing motorists because the “[g]overnment has a duty to prevent a 
foreseeably dangerous individual from wandering about unattended”). 
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more FTCA claims than any other function.251  Because Congress 
extended FTCA protection to tribal contractors, they are deemed to 
be employees of the federal government for FTCA purposes, but 
often these cases turn on whether the alleged tortfeasor was acting as 
a federal law enforcement officer, which is a separate designation.252  
Under a BIA contract, tribal law enforcement officers are not 
automatically considered federal law enforcement officers, but they 
may be commissioned as such on a case-by-case basis.253  The 
regulations clearly contemplate that the tribes could contract for law 
enforcement but have officers who fall short of technically being 
federal law enforcement officers.254 
Often tribal police departments work in conjunction with BIA 
officers who are federal law enforcement officers, but this 
cooperation alone is not enough to make the tribal law enforcement 
officers federal law enforcement officers for FTCA purposes.255  For 
tribal officers to execute federal law, the tribe must first execute cross 
deputation agreements and issue Special Law Enforcement 
Commissions (SLECs).256  SLECs are agreements that allow tribal 
officers to enforce federal law.257  Tribal officers can be eligible for an 
SLEC once they have met certain requirements, such as receiving a 
firearms certification and maintaining a felony-free criminal record.258 
                                                 
 251. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 9 (noting that certain tribes’ law 
enforcement contracts account for a high number of FTCA claims). 
 252. See, e.g., Henin v. Cancel, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding 
that a Miccosukee police officer was a federal employee for FTCA purposes but not a 
federal law enforcement officer, so the law enforcement proviso was not triggered 
and the FTCA’s intentional tort exception applied to block the claim). 
 253. 25 C.F.R. § 12.21(b) (2012). 
 254. Id.; see Bertagna, supra note 11, at 605 (“The Secretary of the Interior’s 
regulations and related memoranda illustrate how Indian tribes must take affirmative 
steps to have tribal officers authorized to enforce federal law, but no regulations or 
memoranda mention any need of power or approval from the BIA for tribes to 
enforce their own tribal laws.”). 
 255. See, e.g., Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (D.N.M. 2003) 
(explaining that the mere existence of the contract is not enough to make the 
officers federal law enforcement for the FTCA); Locke v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 
2d 1033, 1038 (D.S.D. 2002) (characterizing cooperation between tribal officers and 
federal law enforcement officers as “common knowledge” but declining to find the 
tribal officer in question to be a federal law enforcement officer for FTCA purposes), 
aff’d per curiam, 63 F. App’x 971 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 256. See Bertagna, supra note 11, at 605 (describing the process for allowing tribal 
police officers to enforce federal law). 
 257. 25 U.S.C. § 2803 (2006); e.g., Hebert v. United States, 438 F.3d 483, 484 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (pointing out the overlap in tribal, federal, and local jurisdictions and 
observing that the officer in question had a SLEC to enforce the law of all three 
jurisdictions in certain circumstances). 
 258. Internal Law Enforcement Services Policies, 69 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6322 
(Feb. 10, 2004). 
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In situations where tribal law enforcement officers are not cross-
deputized and not authorized to carry out federal law, these more 
stringent requirements do not apply, and the tribes are free to hire 
and train officers who do not comply with federal regulations.259  In 
some cases, like Red Elk ex rel. Red Elk v. United States,260 the United 
States is held liable for the extreme actions of tribal police officers 
that it did not hire, train, or supervise, but who are found to be acting 
within the scope of employment.261  In Red Elk, a South Dakota tribe 
hired a police officer despite the fact that he had no experience, a 
criminal record, and a history of alcohol abuse.262  Despite the 
officer’s repeated poor performance reports and inappropriate 
behavior at work, the tribe continued to employ him.263  He was 
ultimately convicted of criminal charges for raping a minor he picked 
up on a curfew violation.264  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, in the civil suit, found it to be foreseeable that a male officer 
might do this to a female arrestee, and therefore found him to be 
acting within the scope of his employment under state law.265  The 
court affirmed the district court’s ruling against the United States, 
holding the federal government liable for the tribal officer’s blatant 
and outrageous misconduct, even though the United States did not 
hire or supervise the officer and the officer may not have met 
government hiring standards.266  The court in Red Elk incorrectly 
reasoned that imposing liability would make the tribe more 
accountable,267 even though the United States rather than the tribe 
would pay the claim. 
                                                 
 259. See, e.g., Red Elk ex rel. Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 
1995) (noting that the tribal officer in question was hired despite a history of alcohol 
abuse and a number of misdemeanor convictions). 
 260. 62 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 261. Id. at 1108. 
 262. Id. at 1104. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See United States v. Claymore, 978 F.2d 241, 425 (8th Cir. 1992) (sentencing 
the officer to sixty months in prison). 
 265. Red Elk, 62 F.3d at 1107; cf. Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876, 882 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding an off-duty BIA officer to be outside the scope of his 
employment where he gave a girl a ride in his car and then raped her, and 
distinguishing the case from Red Elk because the officer was providing the kind of 
assistance a civilian would provide). 
 266. See Red Elk, 62 F.3d at 1104 & n.3 (noting the officer’s ten prior misdemeanor 
convictions); see also id. at 1108 (suggesting that imposing liability would improve 
hiring and supervision). 
 267. See id. at 1108 (“This type of justified liability, hopefully, may help improve 
hiring and supervision, and produce a police force fully worthy of the public trust.”); 
see also St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming the 
Eighth Circuit’s Red Elk decision and its statement on “justified liability”). 
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Other courts have drawn fine lines to protect the United States 
from liability for torts committed by tribal law enforcement by 
finding that tribal officers are federal employees for FTCA purposes 
but are not federal law enforcement officers.268  In these instances, 
the law enforcement proviso is not triggered and the intentional tort 
exception bars the claim.269  This is the result even though the claim 
could proceed if the officer was working directly for the BIA.270  Locke 
v. United States271 illustrates how tribal law enforcement officers are 
sometimes considered to be federal employees but not federal law 
enforcement officers.  In Locke, a tribal police officer assaulted a tribal 
police dispatcher by putting an air gun to the back of her head and 
pulling the trigger several times.272  The court found the officer to be 
a federal employee, but because he had not received a commission to 
enforce federal law, he was not a law enforcement officer within the 
meaning of the FTCA.273  Therefore the claim against the United 
States was barred under the intentional tort exception.274 
                                                 
 268. See, e.g., Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(finding a tribal police officer to be a federal employee for FTCA purpose but not a 
federal law enforcement officer and therefore the law enforcement proviso was not 
triggered and the FTCA’s intentional tort exception barred the claim); Buxton v. 
United States, No. CIV. 09-5057, 2011 WL 4528337, at *8 (D.S.D. Apr. 1, 2011) 
(same), adopted by No. Civ. 09-5057-JLV, 2011 WL 4528329 (D.S.D. Sept. 28, 2011); 
United States v. Medearis, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (D.S.D. 2011) (same); Henin v. 
Cancel, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (same); Bob v. United States, No. 
CIV. 07-5068RHB, 2008 WL 818499, at *3 (D.S.D. Mar. 26, 2008) (same); Johnson v. 
United States, No. CIV. 06-1023, 2007 WL 2688556, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 11, 2007) 
(same), aff’d, 534 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008); Washakie v. United States, No. CV-05-462-
E-BLW, 2006 WL 2938854, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 13, 2006) (same); Trujillo v. United 
States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (D.N.M. 2003) (same); Vallo v. United States, 298 
F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1237 (D.N.M. 2003) (same); Locke v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 
2d 1033, 1038–39 (D.S.D. 2002) (same), aff’d per curiam, 63 F. App’x 971 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 269. See, e.g., Trujillo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (“Nothing in the [Self-
Determination Act], or in relevant case law, suggests that the mere existence of a 
Public Law 93-638 contract between BIA and a tribe for the provision of law 
enforcement services automatically confers federal law enforcement authority upon 
the officers in tribal police departments.”). 
 270. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 33 F. App’x 293, 294–96 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(not barring intentional tort claims in an FTCA case against a BIA officer, but 
finding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently prove the elements of the tort); St. John, 
240 F.3d at 678 (not applying the intentional tort exception to claims against a BIA 
officer, but remanding the case for further finding of fact); Waybenais v. United 
States, 769 F. Supp. 306, 309 (D. Minn. 1991) (identifying BIA officers as federal law 
enforcement officers, therefore triggering the law enforcement proviso and allowing 
the suit to proceed). 
 271. 215 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d per curiam, 63 F. App’x 971 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 272. Id. at 1035. 
 273. Id. at 1038–39. 
 274. Id. at 1039. 
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Other courts find that regardless of an officer’s ability to enforce 
federal law, an officer who is enforcing tribal law, and not federal law, 
at the time of the incident is not a law enforcement officer within the 
meaning of the FTCA and therefore the intentional tort exception 
bars claims for negligent torts.275  For example, in Hebert v. United 
States,276 the officer in question had a SLEC, but the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found him not to be enforcing federal 
law.277  Although the reasoning is different from the cases that focus 
on whether officers have federal law enforcement commissions, the 
result is the same and the plaintiff’s claim is barred.278 
The 2000 GAO Report identified the inconsistent results of these 
cases as particularly troubling.279  By barring these claims under the 
intentional tort exception to the FTCA, courts recognize that Indian 
law enforcement officers should not be treated as federal law 
enforcement officers unless they have the requisite training.  At the 
same time, however, victims of intentional torts by Indian law 
enforcement officers are left without effective recourse.280  The 
                                                 
 275. See Hebert v. United States, 438 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding a tribal 
police officer with a SLEC not to be enforcing federal law, and thus not a law 
enforcement officer under the FTCA, when he responded to a domestic dispute at a 
casino); Shirk v. United States. ex rel. Dep’t of Interior, No. CV-09-01786-PHX-NVW, 
2010 WL 3419757, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2010) (finding tribal police officers not to 
be enforcing federal or tribal law, and thus not law enforcement officers under the 
FTCA, when they were accused of negligently allowing a drunk driver to leave a 
traffic stop before he ultimately collided with a motorcycle); Boney v. Valline, 597 F. 
Supp. 2d 1167, 1174–75 (D. Nev. 2009) (barring an FTCA claim because a tribal 
police officer was found not to be enforcing federal law when he used lethal force 
against the decedent in an incident related to a traffic stop for drunk driving). 
 276. 438 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 277. See id. at 487 (reasoning that the court did not need to determine exactly 
what law the officer was enforcing at the time of the incident because the officer was 
not acting within the scope of his federal employment). 
 278. See id. (finding the officer was not a federal law enforcement officer to trigger 
the law enforcement proviso and therefore the FTCA’s intentional tort exception 
barred the plaintiff’s claim). 
 279. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 33–34 (observing that a large amount 
of these kinds of claims are for intentional torts committed by tribal law enforcement 
officers, which are increasingly being barred because courts find the officers in 
question not to be federal law enforcement officers for purposes of the FTCA); see 
also 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 53 (statement of Barry 
T. Hill, Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and 
Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office) (suggesting this line 
of cases illustrates that the FTCA may be a poor fit for tribal contractors). 
 280. See, e.g., Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (D.N.M. 2003) 
(dismissing all of the plaintiff’s claims).  Indians could potentially pursue a suit in 
tribal court, but nonmembers may not be able to do so.  See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (stating that “absent express authorization by federal 
statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in 
limited circumstances”).  If the tribes in the cases in question had not entered into 
Self-Determination Act contracts for law enforcement services, the BIA would have 
continued to provide the services and the victims could have brought a claim under 
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current situation gives courts a Hobson’s choice by requiring them to 
choose between applying the letter of the law—which would protect 
the United States from liability for intentional torts committed by 
tribal law enforcement officers—and the purpose behind Congress’s 
extension of the FTCA to tribal contractors—which is to provide the 
same coverage the government would have had if it did not contract 
out these activities to the tribes. 
Law enforcement provides yet another example of the conflict 
between established FTCA principles and Congress’s extension of the 
FTCA to tribal contractors.  By squeezing a square peg into a round 
hole, Congress forces courts to mechanically apply the FTCA in ways 
that go against the principles and jurisprudence underpinning it.281  
The resulting case law is inconsistent, providing the tribes that 
contract for critical law enforcement functions with little guidance as 
to which of their actions may be covered under the FTCA.282 
E. Law of the Place:  Covering Tribal Contracts with the FTCA Raises 
Problematic Choice-of-Law Issues 
In FTCA cases, federal courts apply the law of the place where the 
incident occurred.283  Virtually without exception, that has meant 
state law.  After a federal court in New Mexico suggested that tribal 
law should govern, Indian law commentators began advocating for 
applying tribal law in FTCA cases.  This section first examines the 
FTCA’s choice-of-law jurisprudence and then argues against using 
tribal law in FTCA cases.  Regardless of whether courts address the 
issue directly or through state choice-of-law provisions, federal courts 
should not use tribal law as the law of the place in FTCA suits. 
1. FTCA choice-of-law jurisprudence 
An overarching concern in all of the issues discussed in this 
Comment is choosing which law to apply in FTCA suits involving 
tribal contractors.  Applying the FTCA to tribal contractors raises the 
possibility that courts could use tribal law in FTCA suits, resulting in 
courts applying the law of another sovereign, whose law it cannot 
                                                 
the FTCA.  See, e.g., St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 679 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding a judgment for false arrest and false imprisonment against a BIA 
police officer). 
 281. See supra Part II.A (discussing the theoretical inconsistencies that come from 
applying the FTCA to tribal contractors). 
 282. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 35 (noting the uncertainty among the 
tribes as to precisely what the FTCA covers, in part due to the DOJ’s unpredictable 
decisions regarding which cases get representation). 
 283. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
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effectively discern, to determine the United States’ liability in tort.284  
The Supreme Court and virtually all other courts considering which 
law to apply in FTCA cases have interpreted the FTCA’s “law of the 
place” to mean state law.285  State law means the whole state law, 
which includes state choice-of-law provisions to determine which 
state’s law to apply.286  By using the whole law, the Supreme Court 
created the possibility of courts using the law of the place’s choice-of-
law rules to choose the law of another state to govern liability.287  
Federal courts should not use tribal law as the law of the place in 
FTCA suits because it directly contradicts a whole body of FTCA 
jurisprudence that applies state law. 
Furthermore, Congress, in crafting the FTCA, was explicitly 
unwilling to subject the United States to tort liability based on other 
nations’ laws.288  Courts deciding whether to apply tribal law can look 
                                                 
 284. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D.N.M. 1999) 
(ruling that Acoma Pueblo law would govern a medical malpractice case brought 
under the FTCA); infra notes 328–333 and accompanying text (discussing the 
difficulties inherent in accurately determining tribal law). 
 285. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (suggesting the Supreme Court 
had “consistently held” the law of the place to mean state law); Miree v. DeKalb 
County, 433 U.S. 25, 29 n.4 (1977) (asserting that “the Federal Tort Claims Act itself 
looks to state law in determining liability”); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 14 
n.29 (1962) (admitting that there is some ambiguity with regard to choice-of-law 
issues under the FTCA but concluding from the legislative materials that Congress 
intended state law as the law of the place); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 
(3d Cir. 2008) (noting that a claim would not be cognizable under the FTCA if it 
were not cognizable under state law); LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 794 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (declining to apply tribal law in an FTCA case and giving examples of 
other courts reaching the same conclusion); Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 
1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that the FTCA was passed to provide liability for 
ordinary torts as defined by state law and the court does not have jurisdiction unless 
such a claim is made); Schwarder v. United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“Congress plainly intended to define the contours of a ‘tort claim’ by 
reference to state law.”). 
 286. See Richards, 369 U.S. at 14 (providing that Congress intended state law to 
apply in FTCA cases and finding no reason for that to exclude state choice-of-law 
provisions); see also Florey, supra note 157, at 1668 (arguing that state conflict-of-laws 
analysis could result in the application of tribal law); Katherine C. Pearson, Departing 
from the Routine:  Application of Indian Tribal Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 695, 724 (2000) (making a similar argument but concluding that such 
analysis might be unnecessary because of the “black letter rule approach of the 
FTCA”). 
 287. See James A. Shapiro, Choice of Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act:  Richards 
and Renvoi Revisited, 70 N.C. L. REV. 641, 643–45 (1992) (professing that the effect 
has been courts choosing the state’s law where the plaintiff will have the largest 
recovery). 
 288. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949) (“Congress was ready to 
lay aside a great portion of the sovereign’s ancient and unquestioned immunity from 
suit, [but] it was unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon 
the laws of a foreign power.”).  But cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
17 (1831) (categorizing the tribes as “domestic dependent nations”); Cheromiah v. 
United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (D.N.M. 1999) (finding the tribes not to be 
foreign nations because they cannot enter treaties). 
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to the FTCA’s statutory bar on liability for torts arising in foreign 
nations.289  The Supreme Court has examined the legislative history of 
the FTCA’s foreign tort exception and found that Congress declined 
to waive sovereign immunity for torts arising in foreign countries 
because it was unwilling to subject the United States to liability based 
on the law of a foreign entity.290  Though the Indian tribes are not a 
foreign nation,291 the foreign tort exception also applies to areas 
where there is no clear sovereign.292  Some of the same considerations 
apply when deciding if a domestic dependent nation’s laws will 
govern the United States’ liability in tort.293  Applying tribal law to 
FTCA cases raises the same concerns about predictability and 
variation that has given courts pause about applying foreign law.294 
Despite the inconsistency with well-established FTCA 
jurisprudence, commentators have addressed the issue and argued in 
favor of using tribal law in FTCA cases.  One commentator has 
argued that courts considering which law to apply in FTCA claims 
against tribal contractors should reverse the trend and apply tribal 
law as a way of showing respect for tribal sovereignty.295  Another 
commentator looks to additional provisions in the Self-Determination 
Act as suggesting that tribal employment and contract preference 
laws will govern with respect to the administration of these 
contracts.296  The section cited by this commentator, however, comes 
                                                 
 289. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
 290. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221–22 (dismissing a suit for a tort claim on a U.S. 
military base in Newfoundland, Canada because adjudicating the claim would 
require applying Canadian law as the law of the place). 
 291. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (categorizing the tribes as “domestic 
dependent nations” protected by the United States). 
 292. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993) (applying the FTCA’s 
foreign tort exception to bar a claim for negligence arising at a research facility in 
Antarctica). 
 293. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707 (2004) (suggesting the purpose 
of the foreign tort exception is to avoid the application of substantive foreign law 
because Congress was unwilling to subject the United States to another country’s 
law).  But cf. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (rejecting outright arguments based 
on the FTCA’s foreign tort exception). 
 294. See infra notes 354–356 (discussing the difficulties in applying tribal law to 
FTCA cases). 
 295. See Reed C. Easterwood, Comment, Indian Self-Determination:  The Federal 
Government, New Mexico, and Tribes in the Wake of Cheromiah, 38 N.M. L. REV. 453, 456 
(2008) (advancing application of tribal law as a way to foster cooperation between 
the federal government and the tribes).  But see Florey, supra note 157, at 1689 
(observing that in order to apply tribal law in state or federal courts, the tribes would 
have to develop their law in a way that is more similar to the law in those courts, 
which may detract from the cultural benefits of the tribes having their own methods 
of decision-making). 
 296. See Christie, supra note 10, at 128 (arguing that because Congress 
allowed for limited application of tribal law during tribal contract disputes, it 
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from a separate section of the Self-Determination Act than the 
provisions governing tort liability and FTCA coverage, and the author 
provides no evidence as to why the two sections should be read 
together.297  Another commentator contends that the federal courts 
choosing to apply state law rather than tribal law reflects animus 
towards the tribes.298  This line of argument suggests that applying 
federal law would be unfairly using the law of the conqueror.299  
Another author uses a choice-of-law analysis under state law to 
ultimately apply tribal law.300  Using state choice-of-law provisions to 
choose tribal law, however, is still inconsistent with established FTCA 
jurisprudence regarding the law of the place and could subject the 
United States to liability under a myriad of laws, which may be 
difficult, if not impossible to accurately discern and interpret in 
federal court.301 
2. Practical concerns with applying tribal law in FTCA suits 
The possibility of applying tribal law in an FTCA suit assumes 
federal courts are able to accurately discern and apply tribal law.  
Concerns over federal courts applying tribal law are not merely 
theoretical; two federal courts have actually found tribal law to be the 
governing law in FTCA cases.302  In the most prominent case, 
                                                 
must have also intended for tribal law to govern choice of law in FTCA suits 
(citing 25 U.S.C. § 450e(c) (2006))). 
 297. See id. (offering no further evidence of congressional intent to apply tribal 
law in FTCA cases, or explanation as to why that particular and separate section of 
the Self-Determination Act should apply).  Compare 25 U.S.C. § 450e(c) (governing 
wage and labor standards), with id. § 450f(c) (governing liability insurance). 
 298. See Easterwood, supra note 295, at 474 (contending that the rare application 
of tribal law “exposes” the alleged antipathy directed to tribal governments and 
laws). 
 299. Id. at 453–54.  Easterwood does not, however, object to using the FTCA as the 
exclusive remedy for these claims, but rather wants the deep-pocketed federal 
government to defend tribal contractors as governed by tribal law.  Cf. id. (declining 
to address the regulations making the FTCA the exclusive remedy for tribal 
contractor torts). 
 300. See Florey, supra note 157, at 1654 (suggesting that modern conflict of laws 
analysis involves examining an array of factors to determine which law of the state 
has the “most significant relationship” to the incident); Pearson, supra note 286, at 
724 (noting the Second Restatement’s flexible standard for determining which state 
has the most significant relationship to the case).  But see cases cited infra note 338 
(providing examples of where courts did not apply tribal law). 
 301. See Florey, supra note 157, at 1630 (discussing difficulties inherent in applying 
tribal law in federal courts, including language barriers and procedural issues). 
 302. Harvey v. United States (Harvey II), No. 08CV107 MCA/CG, 2011 BL 177075, 
at * 4–7 (D.N.M. June 30, 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 685 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D.N.M. 1999).  But see 
LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases 
considering the issue and reaching the opposite conclusion). 
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Cheromiah v. United States,303 a federal district court in New Mexico 
issued a ruling that the law of the Acoma Pueblo would govern a suit 
alleging medical malpractice at an IHS facility.304  In Cheromiah, a 
young man died after doctors at an IHS hospital on the Acoma 
Pueblo reservation failed to diagnose a deadly bacterial infection 
despite four trips to the emergency room.305  The key reason for 
applying tribal law, however, had nothing to do with respecting tribal 
sovereignty, but rather that New Mexico law included a cap on 
medical malpractice damages while tribal law did not.306  The court 
dismissed other cases reaching the opposite conclusion, suggesting 
that in those cases these arguments were not adequately raised and 
“the fact that it has never been done, standing alone, does not mean 
that it is not what the law requires.”307  This argument simply 
dismisses all of the instances where courts applied state law as 
situations where neither the litigants nor the court thought of 
applying tribal law.308 
Furthermore, at least one of the cases that the Cheromiah court 
cited discussed the issue in some depth and decided not to apply 
tribal law.309  The Cheromiah court also reasoned that applying tribal 
                                                 
 303. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 304. Id. at 1305. 
 305. Id. at 1297. 
 306. See id. at 1309 (quoting a 1995 decision from the Acoma Pueblo which found 
the New Mexico cap of $600,000 “repugnant” to the traditions of the tribe).  But see 
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, 
Harvey v. United States, No. 08CV107 MCA/RLP (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2009), 2008 WL 
7195310 (noting that the Acoma Pueblo adopted the New Mexico medical 
malpractice cap shortly after Cheromiah).  See generally John Bernard Corr, Modern 
Choice of Law and Public Policy:  The Emperor Has the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 647, 694 (1985) (commenting that there “will be an irreducible number of 
cases in which courts will be inclined to employ public policy doctrine” in deciding 
choice-of-law questions, which may not be “doctrinally consistent”). 
 307. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
 308. Id.  The court dismissed a large and diverse body of case law.  See, e.g., 
LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 793 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying North Dakota 
law where alleged malpractice occurred at a government-operated medical facility on 
an Indian reservation); Red Elk ex rel. Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104 
(8th Cir. 1995) (applying South Dakota law where a tribal police officer raped a 
woman he picked up on an Indian reservation); Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 
946, 947 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying North Dakota law where alleged malpractice and 
consequently wrongful death occurred on an Indian reservation); Red Lake Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 936 F.2d 1320, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying 
Minnesota law where property damage occurred on an Indian reservation);  Louis v. 
United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D.N.M. 1999) (applying New Mexico law 
where alleged medical negligence resulting in wrongful death occurred on an Indian 
reservation). 
 309. See Louis, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (concluding that tribal law should not be 
used directly under the FTCA or even under New Mexico law under a choice-of-law 
analysis); see also id. at 1210 n.5 (“The Court does not believe Congress intended 
such a result [as having tribal law govern the United States’ liability in tort] when 
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law would not be unprecedented because although courts generally 
apply state law in FTCA cases, when a tort in an FTCA case occurs in 
places like Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or the Panama Canal 
Zone, courts apply the law of those places, which are not states but 
still have the ability to pass their own laws.310  This argument fails to 
account for the fact that none of those entities exist within the 
boundaries of a state.311  In other situations more analogous to the 
tribal context, like military bases and national parks, courts have 
applied state law in FTCA suits when actions happen in federal 
enclaves within states.312 
The Cheromiah court went on to hold that the law of the Acoma 
Pueblo would find the New Mexico medical malpractices damages 
cap to be “repugnant.”313  One problem with this argument is that the 
court cites a case, Louis v. United States,314 that considered a similar 
factual situation and chose to apply New Mexico law, including its 
damages cap, rather than tribal law.315  Furthermore, the Louis court 
does not analyze the tribe’s position on medical malpractice caps.316  
                                                 
adopting the FTCA, as it strictly limits the parameters of a tort suit brought against 
the federal government.”).  Compare LaFromboise, 439 F.3d at 794 (citing Chips v. 
United States, No. Civ. 5:92-5025-AWD (D.S.D. Apr. 28, 1993), and Azure v. United 
States, No. Civ. 90-68-GF-PGH (D. Mont. May 9, 1991), as examples of courts 
declining to apply tribal law, although not discussing the depth at which the courts 
had addressed the issue or giving any more information about those cases), with 
Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 (citing Chips and Azure but dismissing them as 
instances where the parties did not properly raise choice-of-law issues).  The Chips 
and Azure decisions are not widely available. 
 310. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (collecting FTCA cases applying the laws 
of entities other than states). 
 311. See Bryant v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957–58 (D. Ariz. 2000) 
(distinguishing the examples given in Cheromiah of places like Puerto Rico and Guam 
from federal enclaves located entirely within states and finding it to be significant 
that the Indian reservation in question was located entirely within the borders of 
Arizona); see also Brock v. United States, 601 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1979) (arguing 
that place refers to locality and does not mean “the law of the entity which has 
jurisdiction over the situs of the negligent act”); Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 
228 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1269 (D.N.M. 2002) ([E]ven if tribal jurisdiction concurrently 
extends to the claim at hand, the mere existence of jurisdiction is not determinative 
in deciding what ‘law of the place’ applies” in an FTCA action). 
 312. See, e.g., Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957) (applying 
Washington law where the alleged tort happened while fighting a fire on public 
lands); Will v. United States, 849 F.2d 315, 317 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law 
where an accident happened in a national park); Shankle v. United States, 796 F.2d 
742, 744–45 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law where the tort occurred on a 
military base). 
 313. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (citing Louis for the proposition that the 
Acoma Pueblo courts disagreed on the acceptability of damages caps). 
 314. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 315. Id. at 1209–10 (considering the application of tribal law and rejecting this 
idea in favor of applying New Mexico law). 
 316. Cf. id. at 1210 n.5 (observing that “[i]n the District of New Mexico alone, for 
example, there are great differences between the many tribes and their approaches 
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Once the Cheromiah court issued the order that tribal law would 
govern, the United States settled for an amount not exceeding New 
Mexico’s damages cap, and the issue was never appealed.317 
The court’s logic in Cheromiah is deeply flawed, yet some 
commentators laud this decision as a singular victory over “outsider 
fears” that push courts to reject applying tribal law in FTCA cases.318  
These charges of government prejudice against the tribes do not 
comport with the reality of Cheromiah.  The health center where the 
negligent care in Cheromiah occurred served three different Indian 
tribes, two of which were completely separate pueblos, and the third 
was Navajo.319  Had the Cheromiahs’ claim actually proceeded to trial 
applying Acoma Pueblo law, it would have created problems among 
the tribes sharing the facility, as the other tribes likely would not want 
to be subjected to the law of the Acoma Pueblo in the future.320  In 
recognition of this potentially problematic situation, just a year after 
Cheromiah, the Acoma Pueblo adopted the New Mexico Medical 
Malpractice Act in its entirety, including the cap on damages.321  This 
result diffuses the charges of animus, as the tribe ultimately adopted 
the provision that the government tried to take advantage of in 
Cheromiah. 
Furthermore, courts cannot apply tribal law in FTCA cases if they 
cannot discern the tribal law.  Commentators favoring the Cheromiah 
approach argue under the assumption that the district court was 
readily able to determine Acoma Pueblo law and that it was adequate 
for the situation.322  Some tribes, like the Navajo, do indeed have well-
                                                 
to legal issues [,and] [i]n some instances, the difficulty in proving the existence and 
substance of any tribal law on the subject of the tort would be considerable”). 
 317. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 699 (suggesting that the United States’ desire 
to limit the precedential value of the case was a significant factor in the decision to 
settle).  Pearson incorrectly claims that the United States settled the case for 
$675,000, more than the New Mexico cap.  Id.  New Mexico law limits the amount of 
damages a plaintiff can recover for medical malpractice to $600,000.  N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 41-5-6 (West 2012).  Arizona State Law Journal published a correction noting 
that the United States’ final settlement in Cheromiah was actually for $600,000, and 
thus not for more than the New Mexico cap, although it was contingent on the 
Acoma hospital reallocating $75,000 to use for emergency services in memory of the 
decedent.  Errata, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. xi (2001). 
 318. See Easterwood, supra note 295, at 474 (asserting that cases that fail to apply 
tribal law are “erroneous” and reflect prejudice against the tribes).  But see id. 
(predicting that had Cheromiah been appealed, the “outsider fears” would have likely 
caused the ruling to be overturned). 
 319. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
supra note 306, at 6. 
 320. See id. (noting that the resulting precedent would subject one tribe to other 
tribes’ law). 
 321. Id. 
 322. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 737 (observing that the Cheromiah court 
seemed to assume that tribal law on damages was clear and it conflicted with New 
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established court systems from which federal courts may be able to 
reliably ascertain tribal law.323  Many tribes, however, do not have 
written codes and presumably, to ascertain the law of one of these 
tribes, the parties would have to hire tribal elders as expert 
witnesses.324  Even in Cheromiah, a closer look reveals that Acoma 
Pueblo law may not have been clear.325  There, the Acoma Pueblo 
filed an amicus brief to advise the court on their tribal law.326  The 
tribes themselves worried that the judge relied on “questionable 
precedent” and included a proposed process for responding to 
questions of unwritten tribal law along with its motion.327  Although 
the government ultimately settled and Acoma Pueblo law was never 
tested in court, these motions suggest that determining the law would 
have been extremely difficult. 
Additionally, assuming for the sake of argument that a court 
applied tribal law as the law of the place in FTCA cases, the tribes 
                                                 
Mexico law); Easterwood, supra note 295, at 475 (furthering the idea of tribal law’s 
accuracy by suggesting that New Mexico and the tribes should continue to develop 
tribal law for possible future use). 
 323. See, e.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 201 (2009) (establishing a basis for 
Navajo law); Harvey II, No. 08CV107 MCA/CG, 2011 BL 177075, at * 4–7 (D.N.M. 
June 30, 2011) (applying Navajo law), aff’d on other grounds, 685 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 
2012).  But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978) 
(recognizing “that some Indian tribal court systems have become increasingly 
sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state counterparts,” but ultimately 
declining to allow tribal courts to try non-Indians), superseded by statute, Defense 
Department Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 
1892–93 (1990), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Ben v. 
United States, No. CV 04-1850-PCT-PGR, 2007 WL 1461626, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 16, 
2007) (declining to use Navajo law as the law of the place in an FTCA case); 2000 
Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 20 (statement of Ethan M. 
Posner, Deputy Associate Att’y Gen.) (noting that even within the state of New 
Mexico there are “great differences” among the laws of the tribes). 
 324. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 740 (observing that “[t]ribal law differs from 
tribe to tribe, running the gamut from the detailed code and written decisions of 
the Navajo Nation, to tribes which operate entirely by customary law”).  
Additionally, “district judges expect adequate expert testimony on foreign law and 
the failure to produce it may be quite damaging to a litigant’s case.”  9A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444, at 346–
48 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 
F.2d 1185, 1194 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding the district court’s analysis of Spanish law to 
be insufficient); Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting that 
although Japanese law was well established, the United States failed to prove the 
provision in question because it did not produce an experienced practitioner as a 
witness).  But cf. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (finding that the tribes were not 
within the definition of a foreign country). 
 325. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 739–40 (discussing the procedural posturing 
of Cheromiah in great detail and analyzing the involvement of the Acoma Pueblo 
courts). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 740. 
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would control access to that body of law.328  As noted previously, 
having the federal government’s sovereign immunity protect the 
tribes creates perverse incentives not to cooperate with the DOJ, 
because the tribes ultimately do not pay the damages.329  The tribes 
would have to provide the DOJ with access to and instruction about 
their laws so that the DOJ could try to make an argument against 
recovery for a tribal member.330  This moral hazard would be even 
greater when a tribe lacks a written code at the time of trial, and 
could result in the tribal council formulating law as the dispute 
progresses to trial.331  Such an arrangement would be inconsistent 
with the American legal system and its notions of justice.332  In 
addition, it is entirely foreseeable that both parties to the litigation 
could hire tribal elders with competing interpretations of the law.333  
Some commentators have suggested the use of certification 
procedures as a means for tribal courts to avoid problems of 
discerning tribal law.334  Such a solution could make the process more 
orderly but may not avoid the moral hazard of potentially making law 
                                                 
 328. Id. (noting wide variations in the development of law amongst the tribes, 
ranging from published written codes to systems based entirely on customary law).  
Some tribal law, such as the Navajo statutes and court decisions, are recorded in 
English and can be found on Westlaw, while others are recorded in tribal languages 
or not recorded in writing at all. 
 329. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (reviewing the perverse incentives 
for the tribes not to cooperate with investigations). 
 330. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 331. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 744 (suggesting the tribes have “centuries of 
reasons” for distrusting the federal government); see also Florey, supra note 157, at 
1689 (observing that encouraging tribal courts to adopt more formal procedures so 
that federal and state courts can apply their laws may interfere with the cultural 
benefits that result from the tribes employing traditional methods of decision-
making). 
 332. See John J. Harte, Validity of A State Court’s Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction over 
Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country:  Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in 
State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 92 (1997) (“[T]he fundamental value 
differences between tribal and state justice systems are dramatically different.  The 
very nature of tribal law mandates that only the tribal court, whose law is at issue, be 
authorized to apply it.”). 
 333. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 741 (noting that when courts determine 
foreign law, the process involves witness testimony).  The FTCA, however, does not 
waive the United States’ sovereign immunity for torts arising in foreign countries.  28 
U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006); see supra notes 288–293 and accompanying text (discussing 
the FTCA’s foreign tort prohibition). 
 334. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, § 7.06[2], at 
654 (suggesting certification to tribal courts is the best way for state courts to address 
questions of tribal law); Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State 
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1701 & n.419 (1998) 
(arguing that certifying tribal law questions to tribal courts furthers collaboration 
and communication between the tribes and the federal government). 
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after the fact.335  Further, it would certainly delay the proceedings 
considerably.336 
To date, many courts have considered the issue of applying tribal 
law and decided against it,337 but only one case has followed the 
decision in Cheromiah.338  In Harvey v. United States,339 a federal district 
court in New Mexico found Navajo law to be the law of the place in 
an FTCA suit alleging medical malpractice.340  The court was able to 
cite Navajo law, because that tribe has a well-developed legal system 
with a published code and widely-available reported common law.341  
Still, the court had to fill in gaps in the law with provisions from 
Arizona law.342  Ultimately the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding for the United States but 
refused to comment on the choice-of-law issue, noting that the 
plaintiff clearly failed to establish the elements of his case under both 
                                                 
 335. Cf. Harte, supra note 332, at 96 (noting that to avoid instances of the tribes 
filling gaps in their law after the fact, some courts have found that the tribes are not 
asserting their sovereignty where they have no written laws addressing the issue in 
question). 
 336. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 742 (conceding that the certification 
procedure would be “time consuming,” although ultimately arguing that it is the 
best way for federal courts to determine tribal law). 
 337. See LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 2006) (observing the 
“uncertainty and potential for expanded liability” that would flow from applying 
tribal law and deciding instead to use North Dakota law); Ben v. United States, No. 
CV 04-1850-PCT-PGR, 2007 WL 1461626, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2007) (finding that 
courts have consistently taken the position that state law should apply even when the 
negligent act took place on Indian land); Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. 
Supp. 2d 1267, 1269–70 (D.N.M. 2002) (noting that even if the plaintiffs could 
establish concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal courts, it would not make tribal law 
the law of the place, and applying New Mexico law); Bryant v. United States, 147 F. 
Supp. 2d 953, 959–60 (D. Ariz. 2000) (suggesting that the application of tribal law 
would be an “abrupt judicial departure” from precedent and applying New Mexico 
law); Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 & n.5 (D.N.M. 1999) 
(charging that the use of tribal law would violate congressional intent behind the 
FTCA and applying New Mexico law); cf. Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169, 176 
n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying North Carolina law because even if the court applied 
tribal law, the tribe in question had no law on emergency medical treatment and 
would look to federal and North Carolina law). 
 338. See Harvey v. United States (Harvey I), No. 08CV107 MCA/RLP, 2009 BL 
207883, at *5 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2009) (equating place with a political entity); cf. 
Quechan Indian Tribe v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1103–04 (S.D. Cal. 
2008) (endorsing the Cheromiah approach in theory but ultimately concluding that 
the tribe would not have jurisdiction over a nonmember to enforce the tribal law in 
question and therefore looking to California law). 
 339. No. 08CV107 MCA/RLP, 2009 BL 207883 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d on 
other grounds, 685 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 340. Id. at *9. 
 341. See Harvey II, No. 08CV107 MCA/CG, 2011 BL 177075, at *4–7 (D.N.M. June 
30, 2011) (citing nine separate Navajo cases), aff’d on other grounds, 685 F.3d 939. 
 342. Id. at *7. 
GROSS.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:50 PM 
2012] HELP ME HELP YOU 437 
Arizona and Navajo law.343  By failing to address the issue directly, the 
court in Harvey III left the possibility of tribal law open to future cases 
in the Tenth Circuit. 
Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Harvey III, in LaFromboise v. Leavitt,344 
the Eighth Circuit addressed the choice-of-law issue directly.345  The 
court noted that while the plain meaning of the statute—“the law of 
the place” suggests Congress’s contemplation of a single source of 
governing law, an alternative interpretation would require an inquiry 
into a political entity’s civil authority to cover alleged negligence 
actions arising against private parties, “without any guiding 
principle” to determine the governing law in cases of concurrent 
jurisdiction between state and tribal courts.346  In addition, often these 
cases involve claims against both tribal and non-tribal members, 
creating an overlap of choice of laws.347  The Indian tribes retain the 
power to use tribal law “to punish tribal offenders, . . . to determine 
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, 
and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”348  The tribes, 
however, generally do not have jurisdiction over nonmembers.349  
Interpreting tribal law to be the law of the place would require courts 
to apply both tribal and state law in the same case when parties to a 
single case are comprised of both tribal members and nonmembers, 
because tribal law may not apply to the nonmembers.350  Courts, 
however, have consistently refused to apply the laws of two different 
states exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the site of the incident 
in FTCA cases.351  Therefore, applying tribal and state law to the 
same claims is incongruent with the courts’ dominant construction 
                                                 
 343. See Harvey v. United States (Harvey III), 685 F.3d at 950–56 (expressly 
declining to decide the issue of whether Arizona or Navajo law would govern). 
 344. 439 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 345. Id. at 794. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 20 (statement of 
Ethan M. Posner, Deputy Associate Att’y Gen.) (arguing that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over both tribal and non-tribal defendants would result in applying 
different law to different defendants in the same action, which violates the FTCA’s 
plain language). 
 348. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
 349. Id. at 565. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See, e.g., Brock v. United States, 601 F.2d 976, 976–79 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(applying Washington law where negligence occurred in Washington causing a 
worker to fall to his death from a scaffold into the Columbia river, over which 
Oregon and Washington have concurrent jurisdiction). 
GROSS.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2013  12:50 PM 
438 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:383 
of the FTCA because it can lead courts to apply the law of two 
different places.352 
Furthermore, if courts did apply tribal law, federal employees could 
be subject to the laws of over 550 different tribes, which extends 
beyond the scope of what Congress contemplated in enacting the 
FTCA.353  By incorporating the law of the fifty states into the FTCA, 
Congress did intend for some variation in FTCA jurisprudence.354  
The tribes vary drastically in the development of their legal systems, 
however, and it may be difficult to ascertain the laws of many of the 
tribes.355  Based on these considerations, virtually all courts have 
concluded that Congress could not have meant to subject the United 
States to this much variability, uncertainty, and potentially increased 
liability.356 
3. Using state choice-of-law rules to apply tribal law 
Courts should not use state choice-of-law rules to provide a 
backdoor way to apply tribal law as some commentators suggest.357  
Initially states used a rigid construction of conflict of law based on lex 
loci delicti, the law of the place where the wrong occurred.358  During 
the mid-twentieth century, however, states began adopting more 
flexible standards and today most conflict-of-law provisions choose 
the law of the state with the “most significant relationship” to the 
incident.359  Applying state law and then choosing tribal law through 
                                                 
 352. See LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
“Congress contemplated a single source of governing law”). 
 353. See id. at 795 (remarking that there would be great administrative difficulties 
associated with interpreting the law of the place so as to subject the United States to 
the laws of all of the Indian tribes). 
 354. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 710 (observing the potential for drastically 
different outcomes in similar situations because of wide variances in tribal law under 
a construction of the FTCA that encourages federal courts to apply tribal law as the 
law of the place). 
 355. See supra note 323 (discussing differences in the legal systems among the 
tribes). 
 356. See LaFromboise, 439 F.3d at 795 (suggesting that Congress could not possibly 
have intended to subject the United States to the laws of so many tribes because it 
would cause extreme administrative difficulties); Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 
2d 1207, 1210 n.5 (D.N.M. 1999) (noting the differences in how the tribes approach 
legal issues and arguing that in some instances “the difficulty in proving the 
existence and substance of any tribal law on the subject of the tort would be 
considerable”). 
 357. See Florey, supra note 157, at 1676 (refuting objections to using state choice-
of-law rules to choose tribal law). 
 358. Id. at 1651; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (“The 
place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable 
for an alleged tort takes place.”). 
 359. Florey, supra note 157, at 1654–55; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 145(1) (1971) (“The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an 
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conflict of laws would produce the same result as in Cheromiah but 
would arrive there by different reasoning.  Still, courts in states using 
both approaches to resolve a conflict of state laws have concluded 
that tribal law should not be applied in FTCA cases.360  In Louis, a 
federal district court in New Mexico used the lex loci deliciti approach 
and found New Mexico law to apply because the plaintiff died in an 
Albuquerque hospital, rather than in Indian country.361  
Commentators argue that this approach allows for application of 
tribal law under a different set of facts.362  The Louis court’s discussion 
of its strong reservations against applying tribal law, however, suggests 
that those commentators may be overly optimistic.363  Furthermore, 
under the modern approach the difficulty in ascertaining precisely 
what tribal law is for a given tribe weighs against choosing tribal law.364 
Even though most courts have rejected the use of tribal law to 
govern these disputes, the statutory scheme governing tribal 
contracting leaves this possibility open, which could potentially 
subject the United States to liability based on tribal law that may be 
nearly impossible to ascertain in some cases.365  Tribal law is not 
objectively better or worse than state law, but the practical difficulties 
in ascertaining tribal law make it inconsistent with the FTCA.366  
                                                 
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties . . . .”). 
 360. Compare Louis, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1210–11 (applying the lex loci delicti standard 
and concluding that New Mexico law applied), with Ben v. United States, No. CV 04-
1850-PCT-PGR, 2007 WL 1461626, at *2–4 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2007) (acknowledging 
Arizona’s use of the “most significant relationship” standard but finding tribal law 
not to be an acceptable option and therefore not getting to the issue). 
 361. See Louis, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (finding that the result of the negligence 
manifested itself off the reservation). 
 362. See Florey, supra note 157, at 1668 (arguing that the Louis court left the door 
open for application of tribal law in future cases); cf. Pearson, supra note 286, at 744 
(suggesting new fact patterns could make tribal law more viable in FTCA cases). 
 363. See Louis, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 n.5 (cataloguing concerns about applying 
tribal law under the FTCA and concluding that interpreting the law of the place to 
be tribal law would constitute an expansion of the FTCA that is best left for 
Congress). 
 364. See Pearson, supra note 286, at 740 (conceding that the difficulty of 
determining the law may in some instances make it harder for courts to choose tribal 
law); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(g) (1971) (listing 
ease of determining the law as one of the factors for courts to consider in choosing 
what law to apply). 
 365. See supra note 337 (arguing this application is not what Congress intended 
when it passed the FTCA). 
 366. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[W]e have consistently held 
that [the FTCA’s] reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State . . . .”).  
While there may be instances where the tribes have written law on the relevant 
subject, allowing the selective use of tribal law in such cases puts courts in the 
uncomfortable position of having to judge the adequacy of tribal law. 
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Further, using tribal law violates the principle of not making the 
United States’ liability dependent on another sovereign’s laws.367 
The potential pitfalls of applying tribal law expose another reason 
why Congress should reconsider extending the FTCA to cover tribal 
contractors and replace it with private insurance.368  Even if Congress 
fails to advance a comprehensive solution, it should at least specify 
that state law, rather than tribal law, should apply in these situations. 
Congress took the drastic step of extending the FTCA to keep costs 
down for the tribes entering into Self-Determination Act contracts, 
yet after more than twenty years, most prudent tribes continue to 
purchase private insurance due to uncertainty about the FTCA.369  
The current practice is wasteful in that the tribes save little money 
and the United States ends up paying extra.370  Congress had a 
laudable goal in helping the tribes enter into Self-Determination Act 
contracts, but using the FTCA failed to accomplish that goal, and the 
experiment in extending it to the Indian tribes should be 
abandoned. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM:  CONGRESS SHOULD REPLACE FTCA 
COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIZED PRIVATE 
INSURANCE 
Congress sought to protect the tribes from the costs of buying 
expensive liability insurance when it extended the FTCA to cover the 
tribes’ torts.371  Replacing FTCA coverage with subsidized private 
insurance would simplify the process and cut costs for both the 
federal government and the tribes.  According to a BIA study 
commissioned by Congress, however, many tribes opt to purchase 
private insurance coverage due to either lack of certainty or 
                                                 
 367. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949) (“Congress was ready to 
lay aside a great portion of the sovereign’s ancient and unquestioned immunity from 
suit, [but] it was unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon 
the laws of a foreign power.”).  But cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 
17 (1831) (categorizing the tribes as “domestic dependent nations”); Cheromiah v. 
United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (D.N.M. 1999) (finding that because the 
tribes were not foreign countries this exception could not apply). 
 368. See infra Part III (developing the recommendation for replacing the FTCA 
with private insurance further). 
 369. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 11 (statement of 
Michael Anderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs) (revealing that 
ninety percent of tribes entering into Self-Determination Act contracts buy private 
insurance). 
 370. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 5 (noting that the federal 
government pays for private insurance through Self-Determination Act contract 
support funds in addition to paying for FTCA judgments and settlements). 
 371. See 1987 Senate Self-Determination Act Hearing, supra note 57, at 1 (statement of Sen. 
Inouye) (discussing the problem of “indirect costs” associated with tribal contracting). 
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awareness of the extent of FTCA coverage.372  This practice is wasteful 
for both the tribes and the federal government.  Furthermore, the 
GAO report identified some major problems with applying the FTCA 
to tribal contractors, particularly in the area of law enforcement.373 
The Campbell and Gorton bills from 1998 each contain ideas that 
could usefully guide the analysis of proposals for reform.  The Gorton 
bill, unlike the Campbell bill, proposed to end the experiment of 
covering tribal contractor torts with the FTCA.374  That bill’s sweeping 
scope, however, seems to have rankled some key members of the 
Senate and thus has never been passed.375  The problem with the 
Gorton bill is that it goes too far into the thorny issue of abrogating 
tribal sovereignty, rather than focusing on tribal contractor torts.376  
The Self-Determination Act already waives tribal sovereign immunity 
for cases arising from torts committed by tribal contractors and there 
is no need, from a tort perspective, to go any further.377  The 
Campbell bill, on the other hand, does not extend far enough and 
assumes that the line between what the FTCA covers and what private 
insurance covers is clear.378  The Campbell bill focuses on extending 
insurance to cover areas left untouched by the FTCA.379 
A solution to the problem of liability coverage for FTCA 
contractors would be to combine elements from both bills.  This 
solution would completely remove FTCA coverage from tribal 
contracting and instead focus on assisting the tribes in acquiring 
comprehensive private liability insurance. 
                                                 
 372. See 2000 Senate Tribal Tort Liability Hearing, supra note 101, at 87 (observing 
that neither the tribes nor insurance companies understand what the FTCA covers 
and are unable to use it effectively). 
 373. See generally 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 31 fig.6 (illustrating the poor 
fit between the FTCA and tribal contractors in graphic form). 
 374. See American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong., § 1 (1998). 
 375. See 1998 Senate Tribal Sovereign Immunity Hearing, supra note 91, at 3 
(statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) 
(“Given this dramatic and some would say radical departure from the well-
established course of our history and our laws, I believe it is only natural to inquire 
what may be in law or in fact that would require us to so abruptly abandon what has 
stood for so long.”). 
 376. See American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, § 4 (a) (waiving tribal 
sovereign immunity virtually in its entirety, beyond what would be required to 
replace the FTCA with subsidized private insurance). 
 377. See supra note 89 (discussing the waiver of tribal sovereign immunity). 
 378. See S. 2097, 105th Cong. § 201(b) (1998) (improving coordination between 
the tribes and the federal government on insurance issues); cf. 2000 GAO REPORT, 
supra note 56, at 35 (noting ongoing uncertainty about the extent of FTCA 
coverage). 
 379. See 105 CONG. REC. 9867 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell) (explaining that his bill was “intended to provide a remedy in tort 
situations for those tribes that are not covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act, or 
covered by private secured liability insurance”). 
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Congress should require the tribes to obtain insurance, as it did 
before 1990, and help the tribes pay for insurance through increased 
contract support funds.380  Under this scheme, when an individual is 
injured, he or she can settle with or bring suit against the insurance 
company without worrying that sovereign immunity will serve as a bar 
to recovery.  Furthermore, the tribes have an incentive to undertake 
loss-reduction activities because doing so will bring down their 
insurance premiums.381 
Critics would likely suggest that this kind of measure degrades the 
tribes by treating them like corporations rather than sovereign 
nations.382  They would argue that taking away the FTCA’s 
discretionary function protection would result in the tribes being 
subject to more liability than the government.383  However, even 
though the tribes are indeed sovereigns, Congress intended the 
FTCA to address the United States’ sovereign immunity, not all 
sovereigns.  Therefore, the FTCA should not protect the tribes from 
liability.384  Applying the discretionary function exception, like other 
FTCA provisions, is problematic because it exposes the underlying 
tensions created by a system in which a limited waiver of one 
sovereign’s immunity protects another sovereign from liability.385 
                                                 
 380. The Self-Determination Act mandates that Congress pay tribal contract 
support costs in full, but Congress often fails to appropriate enough funds to cover 
actual costs by setting funding caps.  Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 
2181, 2187 (2012).  The Supreme Court held in 2012 that traditional government 
contract rules would govern and the “[g]overnment must pay each tribe’s contract 
support costs in full.”  Id. at 2186.  The Supreme Court determined that if the 
government fails to pay the promised Self-Determination Act contract support funds, 
the tribal contractor can sue under the Contract Disputes Act and judgments will be 
paid from the Judgment Fund.  Id. at 2193.  Prior to Ramah, the tribes were skeptical 
of any solution proposing increased contract support funding because they could not 
be assured that they would receive the funds promised.  After Ramah, such concerns 
are unlikely to create barriers to the tribes receiving contract support funds.  See id. at 
2195 (underscoring that the government rather than the tribe “must bear the 
consequences of Congress’ decision to mandate that the Government enter into 
binding contracts for which its appropriation was sufficient to pay any individual 
tribal contractor, but ‘insufficient to pay all the contracts the agency has made.’” 
(quoting Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 637 (2005))). 
 381. Cf. Letter from Edward B. Cohen to Jim Wells, supra note 119, at 2 (observing 
that ordinary incentives for loss-reduction activities are not present in tribal 
contracting because the federal government, rather than the tribes, is held 
responsible for the torts committed by tribal contractors). 
 382. E.g., 1998 Senate Tribal Sovereign Immunity Hearing, supra note 91, at 3 
(statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). 
 383. See Schlosser, supra note 89, at 338 (making the point that removing the 
discretionary function protection will lead to more liability than the United States 
would have had if it provided the functions directly to the tribes through the BIA). 
 384. See supra Part II.A (discussing sovereign immunity and the theoretical 
problem of applying the FTCA to tribal contractors). 
 385. See supra note 116 (highlighting the differences between the United States’ 
sovereign immunity and tribal sovereign immunity). 
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Arguing against FTCA protection for tribal contractors does not 
insinuate that the tribes are careless and undeserving of assistance.  
As part of the United States’ continued trust relationship with the 
tribes, the government should work to facilitate Indian self-
governance and help the tribes cover the costs of carrying out Self-
Determination Act contracts, including insurance.386  Rather than 
haphazardly using the FTCA to shield the tribes from liability, 
Congress should assist the tribes in carrying out Self-Determination 
Act contracts in a way that is fiscally responsible and transparent.387 
The funds to pay tort judgments against tribal contractors 
providing services under the Self-Determination Act should be 
appropriated by Congress, rather than given out automatically 
through the Judgment Fund.388  Integrating this funding into a more 
regular budgeting process would further the goal of Indian self-
governance in that the tribes would still be protected against tort 
liability but would have to take an active role in the process. 
Nothing prevents individual tribes from fashioning statutes like the 
FTCA to dictate their sovereign immunity and tort liability relating to 
their members.389  A tribal statute could very well include protection 
for discretionary functions of tribal employees.  Such a statute, 
modeled on the FTCA, could also include an administrative claim 
requirement to encourage settlement. 
                                                 
 386. See Statement on Congressional Passage of Tribal Law and Order Legislation, 
2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 21, 2010) (suggesting the United States is still 
committed to facilitating tribal autonomy through Self-Determination Act contracts).  
See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After 
Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 635–36 (1982) (discussing the trust relationship 
between the federal government and the Indian tribes). 
 387. Critics suggest that the Judgment Fund is not transparent because there is no 
systematic way to track how much the United States pays out of the fund, which is not 
subject to the traditional appropriations process.  See Judgment Fund Transparency 
Act of 2011, H.R. 1446, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing reform by requiring all 
judgments paid out of the Judgment Fund to be posted on a website).  The 
Judgment Fund Transparency Act has no co-sponsors and has not received any 
committee attention.  Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 1446, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:H.R.1446: (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). 
 388. See FIGLEY, supra note 20, at 75–77 (discussing the history of the Judgment 
Fund); id. app. E at 145 (providing a sample letter with the information needed to 
receive payment from the Judgment Fund). 
 389. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (noting that “‘the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations’” (quoting Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981))). 
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CONCLUSION 
Using the FTCA to cover torts committed by tribal contractors 
contravenes the FTCA both in theory and in practice.  Congress 
extended the FTCA to cover tribal contractors to try to facilitate more 
contracting, but it failed to consider the far-reaching implications of 
the extension. 
Applying a waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity to 
tribal sovereigns convolutes the logic behind FTCA jurisprudence in 
numerous areas.  It muddies the application of the FTCA’s 
discretionary function protection.  Courts have struggled to 
determine the extent to which the tribes can exercise the discretion 
that is usually reserved only for federal employees and expressly 
withheld from contractors.  Furthermore, applying the FTCA to tribal 
contractors makes it hard to determine when employees are to be 
considered within the scope of their employment, a key 
determination in evaluating FTCA liability.  The system breaks down 
even further with tribal law enforcement officers, which is one of the 
main areas for which the tribes enter into Self-Determination Act 
contracts.  Here, a loophole bars government liability for tribal 
contractor actions where the victim could otherwise proceed if the 
tortious officer worked directly for the government.  These cases also 
raise choice-of-law issues, leading to the possibility that courts could 
apply tribal law rather than federal law.  Courts may, however, have 
trouble accurately discerning tribal law, and applying another 
nation’s laws is inconsistent with the FTCA’s rule against applying the 
laws of foreign nations. 
Although Congress sought to simplify liability coverage for tribal 
contractors by extending the FTCA, in practice, the current statutory 
scheme has only created more confusion.  Courts have produced 
inconsistent and bizarre results, causing uncertainty over coverage.  
As a result, savvy tribes with many Self-Determination Act contracts 
often decide to play it safe and opt to purchase private liability 
insurance that is duplicative of whatever coverage the FTCA provides.  
Congress’s “solution” not only fails to solve or mitigate the problem 
for the tribes, but it also causes the government to incur the extra 
cost of defending related cases. 
Congress should abandon its experiment of using the FTCA to 
cover tribal contractors and should instead help the tribes purchase 
private insurance to protect them from liability incurred while 
carrying out Self-Determination Act contracts.  Doing so would not 
downgrade the tribes’ sovereign status.  Instead, helping the tribes 
purchase private insurance would empower the tribes to take a more 
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active role in self-governance.  As the tribes undertake more Self-
Determination functions, they must take on increased responsibility if 
they hope to achieve true self-determination. 
